markdown-html-git

maintainer gameplayer · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt tarball (pkg.tar.gz) from a personal/unofficial host (markdown.chimmie.k.vu) with sha256sums set to 'SKIP', meaning no integrity verification is performed. The tarball is then extracted and its contents are copied directly into the package root (cp -rv * ${pkgdir}/), including executables placed in /usr/bin/ that are chmod +x'd. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the downloaded binary artifact is unverified, comes from a non-standard personal host, and installs executable code system-wide. The pkgver() function uses the sha256 of the downloaded tarball as a version string, which is an unusual pattern that does not substitute for a proper checksum in sha256sums. The combination of SKIP checksum, personal host, and direct installation of prebuilt executables constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:34 "https://markdown.chimmie.k.vu/packages/zst/pkg.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt tarball (pkg.tar.gz) from a personal/unofficial host (markdown.chimmie.k.vu) with sha256sums set to 'SKIP', meaning no integrity verification is performed. The tarball is then extracted and its contents are copied directly into the package root (cp -rv * ${pkgdir}/), including executables placed in /usr/bin/ that are chmod +x'd. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the downloaded binary artifact is unverified, comes from a non-standard personal host, and installs executable code system-wide. The pkgver() function uses the sha256 of the downloaded tarball as a version string, which is an unusual pattern that does not substitute for a proper checksum in sha256sums. The combination of SKIP checksum, personal host, and direct installation of prebuilt executables constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Chimmie Firefly <gameplayer2019pl (at) tutamail (dot) com>
2pkgname=markdown-html-git
3_pkgname=markdown-html-git
4pkgver=0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='A Shell-based markdown to html solution.'
7
8arch=(
9 'any'
10)
11
12url="https://markdown.chimmie.k.vu"
13license=('Akini 3.1')
14
15depends=(
16 'sed'
17 'gawk'
18 'coreutils'
19)
20
21makedepends=(
22 'pacman'
23)
24
25provides=(
26 'markdown-html'
27)
28
29conflicts=(
30 'markdown-html'
31)
32
33source=(
34 "https://markdown.chimmie.k.vu/packages/zst/pkg.tar.gz"
35)
36
37noextract=("pkg.tar.gz")
38
39sha256sums=(
40 'SKIP'
41)
42
43pkgver() {
44 cd "${srcdir}"
45 echo 'r'"$(sha256sum pkg.tar.gz | cut -d ' ' -f 1)"
46}
47
48build() {
49 cd "${srcdir}"
50 tar -xvf pkg.tar.gz
51 mv default-fs "${pkgname}"
52
53}
54
55package() {
56 cd "${srcdir}"
57 cd "${srcdir}/${pkgname}"
58 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}" 2>/dev/null 3>&2
59 cp -rv * "${pkgdir}/"
60 chmod +x "${pkgdir}"/usr/bin/*
61}
62

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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