marmota

maintainer bountin · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package from download.marmota.app, which is the official vendor download host for the Marmota application. The binary is an Electron-based app (gtk3/nss/libxss deps confirm this) and is extracted directly into pkgdir, meaning whatever is in that .deb gets installed and executed on the user's system. A b2sum checksum is provided, which pins the specific artifact. The host appears to be the legitimate upstream distribution channel for this proprietary application. This is a standard pattern for AUR packages wrapping proprietary software distributed as .deb files (similar to slack, discord, zoom, etc.). The risk is the standard supply-chain concern of trusting a single vendor-controlled binary host with no reproducibility — if the vendor's server is compromised or the vendor pushes a malicious update, the checksum would need to be updated to catch it, but the current pinned checksum does provide integrity for the specific version. This is a genuine medium-severity concern (executed binary from a single vendor host) but not an active attack or clearly malicious pattern.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://download.marmota.app/linux/deb/x64/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs a prebuilt binary .deb package from download.marmota.app, which is the official vendor download host for the Marmota application. The binary is an Electron-based app (gtk3/nss/libxss deps confirm this) and is extracted directly into pkgdir, meaning whatever is in that .deb gets installed and executed on the user's system. A b2sum checksum is provided, which pins the specific artifact. The host appears to be the legitimate upstream distribution channel for this proprietary application. This is a standard pattern for AUR packages wrapping proprietary software distributed as .deb files (similar to slack, discord, zoom, etc.). The risk is the standard supply-chain concern of trusting a single vendor-controlled binary host with no reproducibility — if the vendor's server is compromised or the vendor pushes a malicious update, the checksum would need to be updated to catch it, but the current pinned checksum does provide integrity for the specific version. This is a genuine medium-severity concern (executed binary from a single vendor host) but not an active attack or clearly malicious pattern.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: "bountin" Martin Prebio
    
      2
    
      3pkgname=marmota
    
      4pkgver=22.17.0
    
      5pkgrel=1
    
      6pkgdesc="Simple Markdown Presentations"
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8url=https://marmota.app/downloads/thank-you/#linux
    
      9licence=('unknown')
    
      10depends=("gtk3" "libxss" "libxtst" "nss")
    
      11source=("https://download.marmota.app/linux/deb/x64/${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      12noextract=("${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      13b2sums=('190afa970dcc419ce6bca12f6cad7c557389aaa9d90f3999a473be316fce4bd73a9eff1eb0fc6e6399f9fecba8241866ddbe168d4692ad79a34130117f79c575')
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  bsdtar -O -xf "${pkgname}_${pkgver}_amd64.deb" data.tar.xz | bsdtar -C "${pkgdir}" -xJf -
    
      17
    
      18  # Permissions fix
    
      19  find "${pkgdir}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} \;
    
      20
    
      21  # Move license
    
      22#  install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      23#  mv "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      24#  ln -s "/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
    
      25}
    
      26
    
      27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2