mastergo-uos

MEDIUM
maintainer Integral 2 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (an Electron/Chromium-based desktop application) from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) app store package mirror — a Chinese Linux distribution's official app store infrastructure, not the upstream vendor's (mastergo.com) own distribution channel. While uniontech.com is a real company (makers of Deepin/UOS Linux), this is still a third-party redistributor rather than the upstream software vendor's own release host. The extracted binary is directly executed (master-desktop is symlinked into /usr/bin), so any tampering or compromise of that host would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha512sum is present and pinned, which mitigates interception risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source, executed binary from a third-party redistribution host rather than the software author's official release channel.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 "https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.mastergo/com.mastergo_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (an Electron/Chromium-based desktop application) from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) app store package mirror — a Chinese Linux distribution's official app store infrastructure, not the upstream vendor's (mastergo.com) own distribution channel. While uniontech.com is a real company (makers of Deepin/UOS Linux), this is still a third-party redistributor rather than the upstream software vendor's own release host. The extracted binary is directly executed (master-desktop is symlinked into /usr/bin), so any tampering or compromise of that host would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha512sum is present and pinned, which mitigates interception risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source, executed binary from a third-party redistribution host rather than the software author's official release channel.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Integral <integral@member.fsf.org>
2
3pkgname=mastergo-uos
4pkgver=1.2.1
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A professional UI/UX design software for teamwork."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://mastergo.com/"
9license=('custom')
10depends=('nss' 'gtk3' 'python' 'alsa-lib')
11source=(
12 "https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.mastergo/com.mastergo_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
13)
14sha512sums=('06fafdeb12b5196d7029a3a8179ab4697eb20fd1a81b790ff9e5db84d4c5479887d595f3dcf16a20b7bb7bd1fa6ef9ab3fdd9820eef7548f8b6ed8a88e060537')
15
16package() {
17 echo " -> Extracting the data.tar.xz..."
18 bsdtar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
19 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/"
20
21 echo " -> Installing..."
22 # Launcher
23 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
24 ln -s "/opt/apps/com.mastergo/files/master-desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
25 # Desktop Entry
26 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/entries/applications/com.mastergo.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
27 # Icon
28 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/entries/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/com.mastergo.svg" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/"
29 # License
30 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/files/LICENSE.electron.txt" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
31 install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/files/LICENSES.chromium.html" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
32}
33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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