mastergo-uos
The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (an Electron/Chromium-based desktop application) from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) app store package mirror — a Chinese Linux distribution's official app store infrastructure, not the upstream vendor's (mastergo.com) own distribution channel. While uniontech.com is a real company (makers of Deepin/UOS Linux), this is still a third-party redistributor rather than the upstream software vendor's own release host. The extracted binary is directly executed (master-desktop is symlinked into /usr/bin), so any tampering or compromise of that host would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha512sum is present and pinned, which mitigates interception risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source, executed binary from a third-party redistribution host rather than the software author's official release channel.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
"https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.mastergo/com.mastergo_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary .deb (an Electron/Chromium-based desktop application) from home-store-packages.uniontech.com, which is the UOS (UnionTech OS / Deepin) app store package mirror — a Chinese Linux distribution's official app store infrastructure, not the upstream vendor's (mastergo.com) own distribution channel. While uniontech.com is a real company (makers of Deepin/UOS Linux), this is still a third-party redistributor rather than the upstream software vendor's own release host. The extracted binary is directly executed (master-desktop is symlinked into /usr/bin), so any tampering or compromise of that host would result in arbitrary code execution. The sha512sum is present and pinned, which mitigates interception risk but not a compromised upstream host. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: a prebuilt, closed-source, executed binary from a third-party redistribution host rather than the software author's official release channel.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Integral <integral@member.fsf.org>
pkgname=mastergo-uos
pkgver=1.2.1
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A professional UI/UX design software for teamwork."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://mastergo.com/"
license=('custom')
depends=('nss' 'gtk3' 'python' 'alsa-lib')
source=(
"https://home-store-packages.uniontech.com/appstore/pool/appstore/c/com.mastergo/com.mastergo_${pkgver}_amd64.deb"
)
sha512sums=('06fafdeb12b5196d7029a3a8179ab4697eb20fd1a81b790ff9e5db84d4c5479887d595f3dcf16a20b7bb7bd1fa6ef9ab3fdd9820eef7548f8b6ed8a88e060537')
package() {
echo " -> Extracting the data.tar.xz..."
bsdtar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}/"
chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/"
echo " -> Installing..."
# Launcher
mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
ln -s "/opt/apps/com.mastergo/files/master-desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
# Desktop Entry
install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/entries/applications/com.mastergo.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
# Icon
install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/entries/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/com.mastergo.svg" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/"
# License
install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/files/LICENSE.electron.txt" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
install -Dm644 "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/com.mastergo/files/LICENSES.chromium.html" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |