max-appimage

maintainer kuhtoxo · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.max.ru (an unofficial/vendor-specific host, not a well-known official mirror) and executes it during the prepare() phase (--appimage-extract). The binary is then installed as an executable. While MAX is a Russian messenger service and download.max.ru appears to be its official distribution host, it is not a widely recognized or auditable source. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is a closed-source, prebuilt binary executed and installed from a single vendor-controlled host with no independent verification mechanism — a genuine supply-chain risk if the host is compromised or the binary is silently replaced. This fits the medium category: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern from an unofficial/unverifiable binary host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:26 source_x86_64=("http://download.max.ru/electron/${_filename}")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.max.ru (an unofficial/vendor-specific host, not a well-known official mirror) and executes it during the prepare() phase (--appimage-extract). The binary is then installed as an executable. While MAX is a Russian messenger service and download.max.ru appears to be its official distribution host, it is not a widely recognized or auditable source. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is a closed-source, prebuilt binary executed and installed from a single vendor-controlled host with no independent verification mechanism — a genuine supply-chain risk if the host is compromised or the binary is silently replaced. This fits the medium category: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern from an unofficial/unverifiable binary host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: KUHTOXO https://aur.archlinux.org/account/kuhtoxo
2
3pkgname=max-appimage
4pkgver=26.1.4.11224
5pkgrel=1
6
7pkgdesc="MAX messenger."
8arch=("x86_64")
9url='https://max.ru'
10license=("custom:max")
11categories=("network")
12provides=("${pkgname%-appimage}")
13conflicts=("${pkgname%-appimage}")
14optdepends=(
15 'libappindicator-gtk3: tray icon'
16 'libayatana-appindicator: tray icon'
17)
18options=('!strip')
19
20_app_name="MAX"
21_filename="${_app_name}.AppImage"
22_squashfs_desktop_file="${_app_name}.desktop"
23_squashfs_icon_file="${_app_name}.png"
24_install_path="/opt/appimages"
25
26source_x86_64=("http://download.max.ru/electron/${_filename}")
27sha256sums_x86_64=('2a62165974fce37f268037823178cfaac4e5f81c215d5df8564109fff7378281')
28
29prepare() {
30 chmod a+x ${srcdir}/${_filename}
31 ${srcdir}/${_filename} --appimage-extract > /dev/null
32 sed -i -E "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=${_install_path}/${_filename}|" "squashfs-root/${_squashfs_desktop_file}"
33}
34
35package() {
36 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}"/${_filename} "${pkgdir}"/${_install_path}/${_filename}
37
38 # install icons
39 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
40 cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership "squashfs-root/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share"
41 chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
42 find "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons" -type f -name "${_squashfs_icon_file}" -exec chmod 644 {} \;
43
44 # install appication desktop file
45 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${_squashfs_desktop_file}" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
46}
47

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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