max-appimage
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.max.ru (an unofficial/vendor-specific host, not a well-known official mirror) and executes it during the prepare() phase (--appimage-extract). The binary is then installed as an executable. While MAX is a Russian messenger service and download.max.ru appears to be its official distribution host, it is not a widely recognized or auditable source. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is a closed-source, prebuilt binary executed and installed from a single vendor-controlled host with no independent verification mechanism — a genuine supply-chain risk if the host is compromised or the binary is silently replaced. This fits the medium category: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern from an unofficial/unverifiable binary host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:26
source_x86_64=("http://download.max.ru/electron/${_filename}")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.max.ru (an unofficial/vendor-specific host, not a well-known official mirror) and executes it during the prepare() phase (--appimage-extract). The binary is then installed as an executable. While MAX is a Russian messenger service and download.max.ru appears to be its official distribution host, it is not a widely recognized or auditable source. The sha256sum provides some integrity protection, but there is no GPG signature verification. The core concern is a closed-source, prebuilt binary executed and installed from a single vendor-controlled host with no independent verification mechanism — a genuine supply-chain risk if the host is compromised or the binary is silently replaced. This fits the medium category: not clearly malicious, but a real code-execution concern from an unofficial/unverifiable binary host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: KUHTOXO https://aur.archlinux.org/account/kuhtoxo
pkgname=max-appimage
pkgver=26.1.4.11224
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="MAX messenger."
arch=("x86_64")
url='https://max.ru'
license=("custom:max")
categories=("network")
provides=("${pkgname%-appimage}")
conflicts=("${pkgname%-appimage}")
optdepends=(
'libappindicator-gtk3: tray icon'
'libayatana-appindicator: tray icon'
)
options=('!strip')
_app_name="MAX"
_filename="${_app_name}.AppImage"
_squashfs_desktop_file="${_app_name}.desktop"
_squashfs_icon_file="${_app_name}.png"
_install_path="/opt/appimages"
source_x86_64=("http://download.max.ru/electron/${_filename}")
sha256sums_x86_64=('2a62165974fce37f268037823178cfaac4e5f81c215d5df8564109fff7378281')
prepare() {
chmod a+x ${srcdir}/${_filename}
${srcdir}/${_filename} --appimage-extract > /dev/null
sed -i -E "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=${_install_path}/${_filename}|" "squashfs-root/${_squashfs_desktop_file}"
}
package() {
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}"/${_filename} "${pkgdir}"/${_install_path}/${_filename}
# install icons
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
cp -dpr --no-preserve=ownership "squashfs-root/usr/share/icons" "${pkgdir}/usr/share"
chmod -R 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons"
find "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons" -type f -name "${_squashfs_icon_file}" -exec chmod 644 {} \;
# install appication desktop file
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/squashfs-root/${_squashfs_desktop_file}" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |