mc-itemscroller-116-fabric

maintainer orphaned · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (the personal site of the well-known Minecraft modder 'masa', author of mods like MiniHUD, Litematica, etc.) with sha1sums='SKIP', then uses jq to extract a download URL from that manifest and fetches the actual JAR at build time via wget — with no integrity check whatsoever on the downloaded JAR. Two real concerns: (1) the manifest is fetched with SKIP checksum, meaning any MITM or server compromise could redirect the build to an arbitrary JAR; (2) the JAR URL is fully controlled by the manifest content, so a compromised manifest could point wget at any executable. While masa.dy.fi is a legitimate and well-known host for these Minecraft mods (not a random personal host), the complete absence of checksums on both the manifest and the final executed JAR is a genuine supply-chain concern. The pattern of fetching a manifest to derive a URL and then executing the result without verification is inherently risky regardless of the host's reputation. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (the personal site of the well-known Minecraft modder 'masa', author of mods like MiniHUD, Litematica, etc.) with sha1sums='SKIP', then uses jq to extract a download URL from that manifest and fetches the actual JAR at build time via wget — with no integrity check whatsoever on the downloaded JAR. Two real concerns: (1) the manifest is fetched with SKIP checksum, meaning any MITM or server compromise could redirect the build to an arbitrary JAR; (2) the JAR URL is fully controlled by the manifest content, so a compromised manifest could point wget at any executable. While masa.dy.fi is a legitimate and well-known host for these Minecraft mods (not a random personal host), the complete absence of checksums on both the manifest and the final executed JAR is a genuine supply-chain concern. The pattern of fetching a manifest to derive a URL and then executing the result without verification is inherently risky regardless of the host's reputation. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
2
3_modname=itemscroller
4_mcver="1.16.4"
5pkgname=mc-itemscroller-116-fabric
6pkgver="0.15.0.dev.20210108.022049"
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="A client-side mod that adds several ways of moving items in inventory GUIs."
9arch=('any')
10url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
11license=('LGPL')
12makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
13source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
14sha1sums=('SKIP')
15
16pkgver() {
17 cd $srcdir
18 cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
19}
20
21build() {
22 wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
23}
24
25package() {
26 install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
27
28 cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
29 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.jar"
30}
31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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