mc-itemscroller-117-fabric

maintainer eatmyvenom · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (a personal/unofficial host run by the mod author 'masa'), then dynamically extracts a download URL from that manifest at build time and fetches a prebuilt JAR with wget — with no checksum verification on the JAR itself. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the manifest is checksummed, but the actual executable JAR downloaded via the URL embedded in that manifest has no integrity check whatsoever. If masa.dy.fi were compromised or the manifest tampered with, an arbitrary JAR would be executed in the Minecraft JVM. The host is the mod author's own server (not a random third party), and masa is a well-known Minecraft modder, so this is not clearly malicious — but the pattern of downloading an unverified binary from a personal host at build time is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk. The cheaper model's assessment is correct.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (a personal/unofficial host run by the mod author 'masa'), then dynamically extracts a download URL from that manifest at build time and fetches a prebuilt JAR with wget — with no checksum verification on the JAR itself. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: the manifest is checksummed, but the actual executable JAR downloaded via the URL embedded in that manifest has no integrity check whatsoever. If masa.dy.fi were compromised or the manifest tampered with, an arbitrary JAR would be executed in the Minecraft JVM. The host is the mod author's own server (not a random third party), and masa is a well-known Minecraft modder, so this is not clearly malicious — but the pattern of downloading an unverified binary from a personal host at build time is a real medium-severity supply-chain risk. The cheaper model's assessment is correct.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
2
3_modname=itemscroller
4_mcver="1.17-snapshot-21w05a"
5_modloader="fabric"
6pkgname=mc-itemscroller-117-fabric
7pkgver="0.15.0.dev.20201218.025932"
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc="Library mod containing shared code for masas client-side mods."
10arch=('any')
11url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
12license=('LGPL')
13makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
14source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
15sha1sums=('3b3c19c94ad38288f78222b4c72847f44df81b34')
16
17pkgver() {
18 cd $srcdir
19 cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
20}
21
22build() {
23 wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
24}
25
26package() {
27 install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
28
29 cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
30 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.jar"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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