mc-minihud-117-fabric

MEDIUM
maintainer eatmyvenom 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi and then dynamically resolves and downloads a JAR file URL from that manifest at build time using wget. Two concerns: (1) masa.dy.fi is the personal/project site of the mod author 'masa' (Matti Ruohonen), who is the actual upstream developer of MiniHUD — so this is effectively the official upstream host, not a random third party. (2) However, the JAR URL is not known at PKGBUILD write time and has no integrity check — the sha1sum only covers the manifest, not the downloaded JAR. The actual executed JAR binary is fetched dynamically without any checksum verification, meaning a compromise of masa.dy.fi or a MITM could silently substitute a malicious JAR that gets installed and later executed by Minecraft. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: an unsigned, unchecked binary from a personal host is downloaded and installed. While masa.dy.fi is the legitimate upstream for this mod, the lack of any integrity verification on the actual installed artifact (the JAR) is a real medium-severity issue.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi and then dynamically resolves and downloads a JAR file URL from that manifest at build time using wget. Two concerns: (1) masa.dy.fi is the personal/project site of the mod author 'masa' (Matti Ruohonen), who is the actual upstream developer of MiniHUD — so this is effectively the official upstream host, not a random third party. (2) However, the JAR URL is not known at PKGBUILD write time and has no integrity check — the sha1sum only covers the manifest, not the downloaded JAR. The actual executed JAR binary is fetched dynamically without any checksum verification, meaning a compromise of masa.dy.fi or a MITM could silently substitute a malicious JAR that gets installed and later executed by Minecraft. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: an unsigned, unchecked binary from a personal host is downloaded and installed. While masa.dy.fi is the legitimate upstream for this mod, the lack of any integrity verification on the actual installed artifact (the JAR) is a real medium-severity issue.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
2
3_modname=minihud
4_mcver="1.17-snapshot-21w05a"
5_modloader="fabric"
6pkgname=mc-minihud-117-fabric
7pkgver="0.19.0.dev.20201218.025957"
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc="A client-side mod that allows displaying various info lines on the screen "
10arch=('any')
11url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
12license=('LGPL')
13makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
14source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
15sha1sums=('3b3c19c94ad38288f78222b4c72847f44df81b34')
16
17pkgver() {
18 cd $srcdir
19 cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
20}
21
22build() {
23 wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
24}
25
26package() {
27 install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
28
29 cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
30 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.jar"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion