mc-tellme-112-liteloader
The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi with 'SKIP' checksum, then dynamically resolves and downloads a .litemod binary (executed/loaded code) from a URL embedded in that manifest — also with no integrity verification. Two compounding issues: (1) the manifest itself has no checksum, so its contents can be silently altered; (2) the binary URL and filename are entirely controlled by whatever the manifest returns at build time, meaning a compromised or malicious manifest could redirect the download to arbitrary code. The host masa.dy.fi appears to be a personal/unofficial host for the mod author (Matti Ruohonen, a known Minecraft modder), so this is not clearly malicious, but the complete absence of checksums on both the manifest and the downloaded binary, combined with dynamic URL resolution, represents a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:14
source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi with 'SKIP' checksum, then dynamically resolves and downloads a .litemod binary (executed/loaded code) from a URL embedded in that manifest — also with no integrity verification. Two compounding issues: (1) the manifest itself has no checksum, so its contents can be silently altered; (2) the binary URL and filename are entirely controlled by whatever the manifest returns at build time, meaning a compromised or malicious manifest could redirect the download to arbitrary code. The host masa.dy.fi appears to be a personal/unofficial host for the mod author (Matti Ruohonen, a known Minecraft modder), so this is not clearly malicious, but the complete absence of checksums on both the manifest and the downloaded binary, combined with dynamic URL resolution, represents a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
_modname=tellme
_mcver="1.12.2"
_modloader="liteloader"
pkgname=mc-tellme-112-liteloader
pkgver="0.6.3"
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="An informational mod for Minecraft. "
arch=('any')
url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
license=('LGPL')
makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
sha1sums=('SKIP')
pkgver() {
cd $srcdir
cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
}
build() {
wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
}
package() {
install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
"${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.litemod"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |