mc-tweakeroo-112-liteloader

maintainer eatmyvenom · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi with sha1sums='SKIP' (no integrity check), then dynamically resolves and downloads a .litemod binary (a JAR-format executed Java archive) from whatever URL the manifest specifies. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: (1) the checksum is skipped entirely, so any MITM or server compromise would deliver an arbitrary binary; (2) the actual binary URL is not known at package definition time — it is resolved at build time from the manifest, meaning the downloaded file is never checksummed against a known-good value; (3) .litemod files are executed by the Minecraft/LiteLoader runtime, so a malicious file would achieve code execution in the JVM. However, masa.dy.fi is the personal/official host of the well-known Minecraft modder 'masa' (Matti Ruohonen), who maintains tweakeroo and several other popular mods, so this is not a random untrusted host — it is the canonical upstream. The risk is real but stems from the lack of checksums and dynamic URL resolution rather than from a clearly malicious actor, placing this squarely in the medium category.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi with sha1sums='SKIP' (no integrity check), then dynamically resolves and downloads a .litemod binary (a JAR-format executed Java archive) from whatever URL the manifest specifies. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: (1) the checksum is skipped entirely, so any MITM or server compromise would deliver an arbitrary binary; (2) the actual binary URL is not known at package definition time — it is resolved at build time from the manifest, meaning the downloaded file is never checksummed against a known-good value; (3) .litemod files are executed by the Minecraft/LiteLoader runtime, so a malicious file would achieve code execution in the JVM. However, masa.dy.fi is the personal/official host of the well-known Minecraft modder 'masa' (Matti Ruohonen), who maintains tweakeroo and several other popular mods, so this is not a random untrusted host — it is the canonical upstream. The risk is real but stems from the lack of checksums and dynamic URL resolution rather than from a clearly malicious actor, placing this squarely in the medium category.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
2
3_modname=tweakeroo
4_mcver="1.12.2"
5_modloader="liteloader"
6pkgname=mc-tweakeroo-112-liteloader
7pkgver="0.10.0.dev.20200811.201751"
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc="a client-side mod, which adds a whole bunch of various different tweaks to the game."
10arch=('any')
11url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
12license=('LGPL')
13makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
14source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
15sha1sums=('SKIP')
16
17pkgver() {
18 cd $srcdir
19 cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
20}
21
22build() {
23 wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
24}
25
26package() {
27 install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
28
29 cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"${_modloader}\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
30 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.litemod"
31}
32

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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