mc-tweakeroo-116-fabric

MEDIUM
maintainer eatmyvenom 1 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (a personal/unofficial host run by the mod author 'masa') with SKIP checksum, then dynamically resolves and downloads a JAR file URL from that manifest at build time using wget — also with no integrity verification. The JAR is an executable artifact (Minecraft mod) that gets installed. Two concerns: (1) masa.dy.fi is not a recognized mod distribution platform, though it is the mod author's own personal site and this mod (tweakeroo by masa) is well-known in the Minecraft modding community; (2) the double-indirection pattern (manifest → dynamic URL → JAR) means the actual downloaded binary is never checksummed, creating a real supply-chain risk where a compromised server could serve a malicious JAR. The SKIP on the manifest is somewhat acceptable for a rolling/dev build, but the complete absence of any integrity check on the executed JAR itself is the core concern. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: unofficial host + executed binary + no checksum.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (a personal/unofficial host run by the mod author 'masa') with SKIP checksum, then dynamically resolves and downloads a JAR file URL from that manifest at build time using wget — also with no integrity verification. The JAR is an executable artifact (Minecraft mod) that gets installed. Two concerns: (1) masa.dy.fi is not a recognized mod distribution platform, though it is the mod author's own personal site and this mod (tweakeroo by masa) is well-known in the Minecraft modding community; (2) the double-indirection pattern (manifest → dynamic URL → JAR) means the actual downloaded binary is never checksummed, creating a real supply-chain risk where a compromised server could serve a malicious JAR. The SKIP on the manifest is somewhat acceptable for a rolling/dev build, but the complete absence of any integrity check on the executed JAR itself is the core concern. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: unofficial host + executed binary + no checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
2
3_modname=tweakeroo
4_mcver="1.16.4"
5pkgname=mc-tweakeroo-116-fabric
6pkgver="0.10.0.dev.20201213.222846"
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="A client-side mod, which adds a whole bunch of various different tweaks to the game."
9arch=('any')
10url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
11license=('LGPL')
12makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
13source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
14sha1sums=('SKIP')
15
16pkgver() {
17 cd $srcdir
18 cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
19}
20
21build() {
22 wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
23}
24
25package() {
26 install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
27
28 cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
29 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.jar"
30}
31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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