mc-tweakeroo-116-fabric

maintainer eatmyvenom · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (a personal/unofficial host run by the mod author 'masa') with SKIP checksum, then dynamically resolves and downloads a JAR file URL from that manifest at build time using wget — also with no integrity verification. The JAR is an executable artifact (Minecraft mod) that gets installed. Two concerns: (1) masa.dy.fi is not a recognized mod distribution platform, though it is the mod author's own personal site and this mod (tweakeroo by masa) is well-known in the Minecraft modding community; (2) the double-indirection pattern (manifest → dynamic URL → JAR) means the actual downloaded binary is never checksummed, creating a real supply-chain risk where a compromised server could serve a malicious JAR. The SKIP on the manifest is somewhat acceptable for a rolling/dev build, but the complete absence of any integrity check on the executed JAR itself is the core concern. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: unofficial host + executed binary + no checksum.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD fetches a manifest JSON from masa.dy.fi (a personal/unofficial host run by the mod author 'masa') with SKIP checksum, then dynamically resolves and downloads a JAR file URL from that manifest at build time using wget — also with no integrity verification. The JAR is an executable artifact (Minecraft mod) that gets installed. Two concerns: (1) masa.dy.fi is not a recognized mod distribution platform, though it is the mod author's own personal site and this mod (tweakeroo by masa) is well-known in the Minecraft modding community; (2) the double-indirection pattern (manifest → dynamic URL → JAR) means the actual downloaded binary is never checksummed, creating a real supply-chain risk where a compromised server could serve a malicious JAR. The SKIP on the manifest is somewhat acceptable for a rolling/dev build, but the complete absence of any integrity check on the executed JAR itself is the core concern. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain risk: unofficial host + executed binary + no checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: EatMyVenom <eat.my.venomm@gmail.com>
2
3_modname=tweakeroo
4_mcver="1.16.4"
5pkgname=mc-tweakeroo-116-fabric
6pkgver="0.10.0.dev.20201213.222846"
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="A client-side mod, which adds a whole bunch of various different tweaks to the game."
9arch=('any')
10url="https://masa.dy.fi/mcmods/client_mods/"
11license=('LGPL')
12makedepends=('wget' 'jq')
13source=("manifest.json::https://masa.dy.fi/api/games/mods/minecraft/latest/client/")
14sha1sums=('SKIP')
15
16pkgver() {
17 cd $srcdir
18 cat manifest.json | jq ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"version\"]" | sed 's/-/./g;s/+/./g'
19}
20
21build() {
22 wget $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"url\"]")
23}
24
25package() {
26 install -d -m 755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft"
27
28 cp $(cat manifest.json | jq -r ".[\"mods\"][\"${_mcver}\"][\"fabric\"][\"${_modname}\"][\"filename\"]") \
29 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/minecraft/${_modname}-${_mcver}.jar"
30}
31

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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