medivia

maintainer Ovsyanka · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
LOW
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a source tarball from the project's official domain for building the client; the host is not whitelisted but is plausibly project-owned, and the payload is not executed remotely or obfuscated.

Triggered rules

LOW AI review downgraded a static finding llm_review

The static rules flagged this MEDIUM, but an AI model (qwen/qwen3-235b-a22b-07-25) reviewed the full PKGBUILD and judged it LOW (confidence 95%): The package downloads a source tarball from the project's official domain for building the client; the host is not whitelisted but is plausibly project-owned, and the payload is not executed remotely or obfuscated.

1 higher static finding superseded - not the current verdict (shown for transparency)
MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://medivia.online/uploads/downloads/medivia-$pkgver-linux-32bits.tar.gz"

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Igor Deyashkin <igor_deyawka@mail.ru>
2pkgname="medivia"
3pkgver="2.9.2"
4pkgrel=0
5pkgdesc="Client for medivia.online mmorpg server."
6arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
7url="https://medivia.online/download"
8# I am not sure what license is used
9license=('unknown')
10depends_x86_64=('lib32-libglvnd')
11depends_i686=('libglvnd')
12makedepends=('chrpath')
13source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz::https://medivia.online/uploads/downloads/medivia-$pkgver-linux-32bits.tar.gz"
14 "$pkgname.desktop")
15
16# The archive does not containing root folder in it. I unextract it later on build stage into separate subfolder.
17noextract=("$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz")
18
19# autofill using updpkgsums
20md5sums=('a15fe61553e4d26656c393cde0897291'
21 '2791be26444cdf1b14d8a49736a6bbb9')
22
23prepare() {
24 mkdir -p "$pkgname-$pkgver"
25 bsdtar -xzf "$pkgname-$pkgver.tar.gz" -C "$pkgname-$pkgver"
26
27 # Rpath of the binary is "RPATH=$ORIGIN:/usr/local/lib:" and I replace it for just "RPATH=$ORIGIN" because we need
28 # $ORIGIN to search for the libfmod.so.11 included in the package in the executable directory.
29
30 # scottmada [explained](https://www.lexaloffle.com/bbs/?pid=29296#p) this:
31 # > It means the binary looks for lib files in this directory before anywhere else. This is not a huge issue, as
32 # > ArchLinux do not use this directory normally, but as this directory is meant for system-wide libraries installed
33 # > by the user, a conflict could occur if the user would install there their own version of glibc (or malicious
34 # > software there). A simple fix would be to delete the RPATH from the binary using "chrpath" or "patchelf"
35 # > commands, after the build, but before the release. The /usr/local/lib is insecure and don't
36
37 chrpath -r '$ORIGIN' "$pkgname-$pkgver/medivia"
38}
39
40package() {
41 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/opt"
42 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
43
44 cp -Rv "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver" "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname"
45
46 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop"
47
48 # I am not sure this is a good way
49 ln -s "/opt/$pkgname/medivia" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname"
50}
51

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 LOW 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 LOW 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 LOW 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 LOW 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 LOW 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 LOW 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 LOW 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 LOW 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 LOW 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 LOW 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 LOW 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 LOW 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 LOW 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 LOW 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 LOW 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 LOW 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 LOW 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 LOW 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 LOW 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 LOW 2

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