mega

maintainer malacology · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from megasoftware.net, which is the legitimate official site for MEGA (Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis), a well-known bioinformatics tool published by Kumar et al. The host is the genuine vendor site, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the package installs a closed-source prebuilt binary without source availability, which is a standard supply-chain concern for any binary-only AUR package: if the upstream host were compromised or the binary swapped, the sha256sum provides integrity checking against the recorded hash but not against a future substitution. The sha256sum is present and hardcoded, which mitigates opportunistic tampering. This pattern (official vendor binary repackaged from a .deb) is common in the AUR for proprietary software (e.g., zoom, slack, discord). The risk is real but not elevated beyond the normal binary-repackaging concern — it is not clearly malicious, and megasoftware.net is the canonical distribution point for this software. Rating medium is appropriate given the closed-source binary execution, though this is a borderline clean/medium case for a legitimate vendor binary with a checksum.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 source=("https://megasoftware.net/releases/mega_$pkgver-1_amd64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from megasoftware.net, which is the legitimate official site for MEGA (Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis), a well-known bioinformatics tool published by Kumar et al. The host is the genuine vendor site, not a personal or unofficial mirror. However, the package installs a closed-source prebuilt binary without source availability, which is a standard supply-chain concern for any binary-only AUR package: if the upstream host were compromised or the binary swapped, the sha256sum provides integrity checking against the recorded hash but not against a future substitution. The sha256sum is present and hardcoded, which mitigates opportunistic tampering. This pattern (official vendor binary repackaged from a .deb) is common in the AUR for proprietary software (e.g., zoom, slack, discord). The risk is real but not elevated beyond the normal binary-repackaging concern — it is not clearly malicious, and megasoftware.net is the canonical distribution point for this software. Rating medium is appropriate given the closed-source binary execution, though this is a borderline clean/medium case for a legitimate vendor binary with a checksum.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Malacology <guoyizhang at malacology dot net>
2# Contributor: Malacology <guoyizhang at malacology dot net>
3
4pkgname=mega
5_pkgname=mega
6pkgver=12.1.2
7pkgrel=1
8pkgdesc="Molecular Evolutionary Genetics Analysis. https://doi.org/10.1093/molbev/msy096"
9arch=('x86_64')
10url="https://megasoftware.net"
11license=('custom')
12depends=(
13 'desktop-file-utils'
14 'gconf'
15 'gtk2'
16 'hicolor-icon-theme'
17)
18source=("https://megasoftware.net/releases/mega_$pkgver-1_amd64.deb")
19sha256sums=('e8ad7b7e174f66ce38a88783960af4fedeaf3b4ce79d7589b3cb8fa7d6d87418')
20
21package() {
22 tar -I zstd -xpvf data.tar.zst -C "${pkgdir}"
23 chmod 755 -R ${pkgdir}/usr
24 cp -r ${pkgdir}/usr/local/* ${pkgdir}/usr/
25 rm -r ${pkgdir}/usr/local
26 sed -i "s/Exec=mega/Exec=mega %U/g" $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/mega.desktop
27}
28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion