memoa-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer hellonico 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binaries (memoa_aarch64, memoa_x86_64) from repository.hellonico.info, which is a personal/unofficial Nexus repository host rather than a well-known project mirror or official vendor CDN. The binaries are installed as executable files in /usr/bin. While sha256sums are provided (offering integrity checking against tampering in transit), the trust anchor is still the maintainer's own server — if that host is compromised or the maintainer substitutes different binaries, users would execute arbitrary code. The license is listed as 'unknown', and the source/desktop files are fetched without a URL (implying they are in the AUR git repo itself, which is acceptable). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a personal host with no independent verification path (no GPG signature, no official release page cross-reference). This matches the classic medium pattern of an unofficial binary host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source_aarch64=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/arch/memoa/${pkgver}/memoa_aarch64")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD downloads and installs prebuilt binaries (memoa_aarch64, memoa_x86_64) from repository.hellonico.info, which is a personal/unofficial Nexus repository host rather than a well-known project mirror or official vendor CDN. The binaries are installed as executable files in /usr/bin. While sha256sums are provided (offering integrity checking against tampering in transit), the trust anchor is still the maintainer's own server — if that host is compromised or the maintainer substitutes different binaries, users would execute arbitrary code. The license is listed as 'unknown', and the source/desktop files are fetched without a URL (implying they are in the AUR git repo itself, which is acceptable). This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed binaries from a personal host with no independent verification path (no GPG signature, no official release page cross-reference). This matches the classic medium pattern of an unofficial binary host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: nico <nico@example.com>
2pkgname=memoa-bin
3pkgver=0.1.375
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="The best for Markdown Editing"
6arch=('aarch64' 'x86_64')
7url="https://example.com/memoa"
8license=('unknown')
9depends=('gtk3' 'webkit2gtk' 'openssl')
10provides=('memoa')
11conflicts=('memoa')
12options=('!strip')
13source=("memoa.png"
14 "memoa.desktop")
15source_aarch64=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/arch/memoa/${pkgver}/memoa_aarch64")
16source_x86_64=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/arch/memoa/${pkgver}/memoa_x86_64")
17
18sha256sums=('72efe0d27e0fb81dd20b151c240ce99dddea08afcb1c6b2deb7556ed2b2690e5'
19 '8bbe11862d09b4d2fa9820b530c16ac6681e52bfe64fb3d8e20cebc9bdb8c2a2')
20sha256sums_aarch64=('445019c7d43088c1f7b4cfc0c391882b4da1e2e34193fdec7d7422e6d9f71b0c')
21sha256sums_x86_64=('a5a9aeef7abe11a74722ac4e958f2643b3f2c85132b920d152141fa4cafb3e84')
22
23package() {
24 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/memoa.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/memoa.png"
25 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/memoa.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/memoa.desktop"
26
27 if [ "$CARCH" = 'aarch64' ]; then
28 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/memoa_aarch64" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/memoa"
29 elif [ "$CARCH" = 'x86_64' ]; then
30 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/memoa_x86_64" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/memoa"
31 fi
32}
33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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