meocloud-cli

maintainer gildasio · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball directly from meocloud.pt (the official MEO Cloud vendor domain, operated by Altice/PT) and installs it system-wide by copying opt/ and usr/ trees. While meocloud.pt is the legitimate vendor's own domain (not a personal or third-party host), the package installs an opaque prebuilt binary with no source build, meaning the sha256sum is the only integrity guarantee. The binary is executed code installed into /opt and /usr, so if the upstream host were compromised or the binary swapped, the checksum would be the only line of defense. This is a classic 'binary blob from vendor' pattern — not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern because there is no reproducible build and the binary runs with user privileges. Severity remains medium: it is the official vendor host, but the pattern of installing unverified prebuilt binaries without GPG signature verification is a real (if common) supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=("https://meocloud.pt/binaries/linux/${arch}/meocloud-${pkgver}_${arch}.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball directly from meocloud.pt (the official MEO Cloud vendor domain, operated by Altice/PT) and installs it system-wide by copying opt/ and usr/ trees. While meocloud.pt is the legitimate vendor's own domain (not a personal or third-party host), the package installs an opaque prebuilt binary with no source build, meaning the sha256sum is the only integrity guarantee. The binary is executed code installed into /opt and /usr, so if the upstream host were compromised or the binary swapped, the checksum would be the only line of defense. This is a classic 'binary blob from vendor' pattern — not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern because there is no reproducible build and the binary runs with user privileges. Severity remains medium: it is the official vendor host, but the pattern of installing unverified prebuilt binaries without GPG signature verification is a real (if common) supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Hugo Castilho <hugo.p.castilho@telecom.pt>
2pkgname=meocloud-cli
3pkgver=0.2.29beta
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Cloud storage service and file synchronization service, command line"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://meocloud.pt"
8license=('custom')
9options=('!strip')
10
11
12source=("https://meocloud.pt/binaries/linux/${arch}/meocloud-${pkgver}_${arch}.tar.gz"
13 "TOS.txt")
14sha256sums=('577236de621f5bab7325bc8e89fcc895a8452a3bf1a4e1bc6353cc36cb46c9e0'
15 '240ca45ba26f1a9df5b277d9b51e2b53a152a9c20c74e6b965e4a60d965fce0f')
16
17
18package() {
19 cp -R $srcdir/{opt,usr} $pkgdir
20 install -D -m 644 "$srcdir/TOS.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/TOS.txt"
21}
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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