mips-linux-binutils-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary RPM (containing executable binutils tools: assembler, linker, etc.) from ftp.linux-mips.org, which is a third-party FTP host rather than an official GNU/distro mirror. The binaries are extracted and installed directly into the system (usr/bin, usr/mips-linux). While ftp.linux-mips.org is a historically known MIPS Linux community site and not obviously malicious, it is not an official GNU source and the package is very old (binutils 2.9.5, circa 1999). The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the source host itself serving a malicious binary. This is a classic supply-chain concern: prebuilt executed binaries from a non-official third-party host. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice, keeping this at medium severity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("ftp://ftp.linux-mips.org/pub/linux/mips/crossdev/i686-linux/mips-linux/binutils-mips-linux-${pkgver}-3.i386.rpm")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary RPM (containing executable binutils tools: assembler, linker, etc.) from ftp.linux-mips.org, which is a third-party FTP host rather than an official GNU/distro mirror. The binaries are extracted and installed directly into the system (usr/bin, usr/mips-linux). While ftp.linux-mips.org is a historically known MIPS Linux community site and not obviously malicious, it is not an official GNU source and the package is very old (binutils 2.9.5, circa 1999). The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not protect against the source host itself serving a malicious binary. This is a classic supply-chain concern: prebuilt executed binaries from a non-official third-party host. The risk is real but not evidence of active malice, keeping this at medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: queueRAM <queueRAM+aur AT gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=mips-linux-binutils-bin
4pkgver=2.9.5
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A set of programs to assemble and manipulate binary and object files (mips-linux)"
7arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
8license=('GPL')
9url="http://www.gnu.org/software/binutils/"
10depends_i686=('glibc')
11depends_x86_64=('lib32-glibc')
12options=('!strip')
13source=("ftp://ftp.linux-mips.org/pub/linux/mips/crossdev/i686-linux/mips-linux/binutils-mips-linux-${pkgver}-3.i386.rpm")
14sha256sums=('1da33af71b846f40f28dd8cc07c9742cafb9352a53b81d0bac0d18cf503b98ad')
15
16package() {
17 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share"
18 cp -a ${srcdir}/usr/bin ${pkgdir}/usr
19 cp -a ${srcdir}/usr/man ${pkgdir}/usr/share
20 cp -a ${srcdir}/usr/mips-linux ${pkgdir}/usr
21}
22

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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