mitalk
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from s1.zb.mi.com, which is a Xiaomi/Mi subdomain (zb.mi.com is Xiaomi's distribution infrastructure). This is not a random personal host — it is Xiaomi's own CDN/distribution server for their MiTalk (miliao) application. The URL pattern matches Xiaomi's known software distribution infrastructure. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob from a vendor CDN rather than source-built, and the sha512sum has only 127 hex characters (should be 128 for SHA-512), suggesting a possible truncation error in the checksum. The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt/MiTalk and executed as mitalk. This is a legitimate vendor binary distribution pattern (similar to how many proprietary apps like Slack, Discord, etc. are packaged in AUR), but the truncated/incorrect sha512sum weakens integrity verification. The medium rating is appropriate: it's a prebuilt executable from a vendor host with a potentially broken checksum, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain concern due to the integrity verification issue.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://s1.zb.mi.com/miliao/apk/miliao/8.8/MiTalk_$pkgver.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from s1.zb.mi.com, which is a Xiaomi/Mi subdomain (zb.mi.com is Xiaomi's distribution infrastructure). This is not a random personal host — it is Xiaomi's own CDN/distribution server for their MiTalk (miliao) application. The URL pattern matches Xiaomi's known software distribution infrastructure. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob from a vendor CDN rather than source-built, and the sha512sum has only 127 hex characters (should be 128 for SHA-512), suggesting a possible truncation error in the checksum. The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt/MiTalk and executed as mitalk. This is a legitimate vendor binary distribution pattern (similar to how many proprietary apps like Slack, Discord, etc. are packaged in AUR), but the truncated/incorrect sha512sum weakens integrity verification. The medium rating is appropriate: it's a prebuilt executable from a vendor host with a potentially broken checksum, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain concern due to the integrity verification issue.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jack Chen <redchenjs@live.com>
# Maintainer: Leihu Xi <leihuxi@gmail.com>
pkgname=mitalk
pkgver=4.0.101
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="MiTalk Messenger"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.miliao.com"
license=('custom')
depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxss')
source=("https://s1.zb.mi.com/miliao/apk/miliao/8.8/MiTalk_$pkgver.deb")
sha512sums=('0d9de4af916e42ab064e19ee04bf7f7986d3f52a2aa64f31a8dee2604cfbd7cee975962ac54903d2ff06c1efe0007e2bf2a41bb28412e7675bb87dbf380fce32')
package() {
tar -xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir/"
install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
ln -s /opt/MiTalk/mitalk "$pkgdir/usr/bin/mitalk"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |