mitalk
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from s1.zb.mi.com, which is a Xiaomi/Mi subdomain (zb.mi.com is Xiaomi's distribution infrastructure). This is not a random personal host — it is Xiaomi's own CDN/distribution server for their MiTalk (miliao) application. The URL pattern matches Xiaomi's known software distribution infrastructure. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob from a vendor CDN rather than source-built, and the sha512sum has only 127 hex characters (should be 128 for SHA-512), suggesting a possible truncation error in the checksum. The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt/MiTalk and executed as mitalk. This is a legitimate vendor binary distribution pattern (similar to how many proprietary apps like Slack, Discord, etc. are packaged in AUR), but the truncated/incorrect sha512sum weakens integrity verification. The medium rating is appropriate: it's a prebuilt executable from a vendor host with a potentially broken checksum, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain concern due to the integrity verification issue.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:12
source=("https://s1.zb.mi.com/miliao/apk/miliao/8.8/MiTalk_$pkgver.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from s1.zb.mi.com, which is a Xiaomi/Mi subdomain (zb.mi.com is Xiaomi's distribution infrastructure). This is not a random personal host — it is Xiaomi's own CDN/distribution server for their MiTalk (miliao) application. The URL pattern matches Xiaomi's known software distribution infrastructure. However, it is still a prebuilt binary blob from a vendor CDN rather than source-built, and the sha512sum has only 127 hex characters (should be 128 for SHA-512), suggesting a possible truncation error in the checksum. The binary is extracted and installed directly to /opt/MiTalk and executed as mitalk. This is a legitimate vendor binary distribution pattern (similar to how many proprietary apps like Slack, Discord, etc. are packaged in AUR), but the truncated/incorrect sha512sum weakens integrity verification. The medium rating is appropriate: it's a prebuilt executable from a vendor host with a potentially broken checksum, not clearly malicious but representing a real supply-chain concern due to the integrity verification issue.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Jack Chen <redchenjs@live.com>
# Maintainer: Leihu Xi <leihuxi@gmail.com>
pkgname=mitalk
pkgver=4.0.101
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="MiTalk Messenger"
arch=('x86_64')
url="http://www.miliao.com"
license=('custom')
depends=('gtk3' 'nss' 'libxss')
source=("https://s1.zb.mi.com/miliao/apk/miliao/8.8/MiTalk_$pkgver.deb")
sha512sums=('0d9de4af916e42ab064e19ee04bf7f7986d3f52a2aa64f31a8dee2604cfbd7cee975962ac54903d2ff06c1efe0007e2bf2a41bb28412e7675bb87dbf380fce32')
package() {
tar -xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir/"
install -dm755 "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
ln -s /opt/MiTalk/mitalk "$pkgdir/usr/bin/mitalk"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |