mitk

maintainer tlss · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from mitk.org (the official MITK project website) and installs it directly into /opt without building from source. While mitk.org is the legitimate upstream vendor site, the package installs a pre-compiled binary blob with all its bundled libraries (cp -r bin/) that cannot be audited. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, and the source is the official vendor download server, which reduces supply-chain risk compared to a personal/unofficial host. However, the pattern of installing an opaque prebuilt binary tarball with bundled libraries (rather than building from source) is a genuine medium-severity concern per AUR standards — users are trusting the upstream binary entirely. The cheaper model's 'non-standard host' concern is a false positive since mitk.org is the official project domain, but the prebuilt binary installation pattern itself justifies medium severity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 "https://www.mitk.org/download/releases/MITK-2024.06.2/Ubuntu%2022.04/MITK-v2024.06.2-linux-x86_64.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary tarball from mitk.org (the official MITK project website) and installs it directly into /opt without building from source. While mitk.org is the legitimate upstream vendor site, the package installs a pre-compiled binary blob with all its bundled libraries (cp -r bin/) that cannot be audited. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, and the source is the official vendor download server, which reduces supply-chain risk compared to a personal/unofficial host. However, the pattern of installing an opaque prebuilt binary tarball with bundled libraries (rather than building from source) is a genuine medium-severity concern per AUR standards — users are trusting the upstream binary entirely. The cheaper model's 'non-standard host' concern is a false positive since mitk.org is the official project domain, but the prebuilt binary installation pattern itself justifies medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: tlss <cn dot jlu dot lp dot 5212 at gmail dot com>
2
3pkgname=mitk
4pkgver=2024.06
5pkgrel=2
6pkgdesc="Medical Imaging Interaction Toolkit (MITK) is a free open-source software system for development of interactive medical image processing software."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://mitk.org"
9license=('BSD')
10depends=(
11 'qt6-svg'
12 'qt6-tools'
13 'qt6-webengine'
14)
15source=(
16 "https://www.mitk.org/download/releases/MITK-2024.06.2/Ubuntu%2022.04/MITK-v2024.06.2-linux-x86_64.tar.gz"
17 "LICENSE"
18 "MitkWorkbench"
19 "MitkWorkbench.desktop"
20)
21sha256sums=(
22 "efb23092b5fdcbd75d300200d9a34ad1522394106d79fe02f2c19b7274fffd52"
23 "e738b539907754ee44cf101687df6b9e31ed7176a11dea077eadfd2f280cbb68"
24 "c12894b678a979ca5db2df171660518d217281304b6bbdbac557a7857148be26"
25 "b942f8c16e5c9fcf771b81e10ef5034e76d03d57e82b05c14bdaf90d6f0827bf"
26)
27
28options=(!strip)
29
30package() {
31 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/LICENSE" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
32 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/MitkWorkbench" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.${pkgrel}/MitkWorkbench"
33 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/MitkWorkbench.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/MitkWorkbench.desktop"
34 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/MITK-v${pkgver}.${pkgrel}-linux-${arch}/bin/mitk.ico" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/mitk.ico"
35
36 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.${pkgrel}"
37 cp -r "${srcdir}/MITK-v${pkgver}.${pkgrel}-linux-${arch}/bin" "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}-${pkgver}.${pkgrel}/"
38}
39

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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