mixo

MEDIUM

maintainer orphaned 1 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from mixo.tech and executes it during the build phase (--appimage-extract extracts and then the entire squashfs-root is installed to /opt). The download host (mixo.tech) differs from the project's primary domain (mixo.dj), though both appear to be operated by the same Mixo company — mixo.tech is their CDN/download endpoint. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates tampering risk significantly. However, this is still a closed-source proprietary AppImage binary being executed and installed wholesale, sourced from a secondary domain. The risk is real but modest: if mixo.tech were compromised or is not actually controlled by the same entity as mixo.dj, arbitrary code would execute on the builder's machine. This fits the medium classification: an executed binary from a host that is not the canonical project domain, with no source code to audit.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://www.mixo.tech/download/MIXO-${pkgver}.AppImage"

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from mixo.tech and executes it during the build phase (--appimage-extract extracts and then the entire squashfs-root is installed to /opt). The download host (mixo.tech) differs from the project's primary domain (mixo.dj), though both appear to be operated by the same Mixo company — mixo.tech is their CDN/download endpoint. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates tampering risk significantly. However, this is still a closed-source proprietary AppImage binary being executed and installed wholesale, sourced from a secondary domain. The risk is real but modest: if mixo.tech were compromised or is not actually controlled by the same entity as mixo.dj, arbitrary code would execute on the builder's machine. This fits the medium classification: an executed binary from a host that is not the canonical project domain, with no source code to audit.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Jose Riha <jose 1711 gmail com>
    
      2# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=mixo
    
      5pkgver=1.71.0
    
      6pkgrel=1
    
      7pkgdesc="Connect your DJ software, sync your library to all your devices, listen to your sets on your phone, and backup your library to the cloud"
    
      8arch=('x86_64')
    
      9url='https://www.mixo.dj'
    
      10license=("custom:${pkgname}")
    
      11makedepends=('gendesk')
    
      12options=('!strip')
    
      13noextract=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage")
    
      14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://www.mixo.tech/download/MIXO-${pkgver}.AppImage"
    
      15        'LICENSE')
    
      16sha256sums=('df877806141c5c89c64178b041a00d1aeecc075252f05561c4c98b8d696e7512'
    
      17            '84b2a88e0ca0dad3ddca2244b6300af37da7c79eb83b7dfa21457f8a72def1ee')
    
      18package() {
    
      19  chmod 755 ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage
    
      20  ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract
    
      21  install -Dm644 squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/0x0/apps/mixo.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/mixo.png"
    
      22  gendesk -f -n --pkgname "${pkgname}" \
    
      23          --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
    
      24          --name "MIXO" \
    
      25          --comment "$pkgdesc" \
    
      26          --exec "${pkgname}" \
    
      27          --categories 'Network;Audio;AudioVideo;Application' \
    
      28          --icon "${pkgname}"
    
      29  install -Dm644 "${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
    
      30  install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
    
      31  install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
    
      32  cp -avR squashfs-root/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
    
      33  ln -s /opt/${pkgname}/AppRun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
    
      34  find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
    
      35  find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type f -exec chmod o-w {} +
    
      36  install -Dm644 LICENSE -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      37}
    
      38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2