mixo

maintainer orphaned · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from mixo.tech and executes it during the build phase (--appimage-extract extracts and then the entire squashfs-root is installed to /opt). The download host (mixo.tech) differs from the project's primary domain (mixo.dj), though both appear to be operated by the same Mixo company — mixo.tech is their CDN/download endpoint. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates tampering risk significantly. However, this is still a closed-source proprietary AppImage binary being executed and installed wholesale, sourced from a secondary domain. The risk is real but modest: if mixo.tech were compromised or is not actually controlled by the same entity as mixo.dj, arbitrary code would execute on the builder's machine. This fits the medium classification: an executed binary from a host that is not the canonical project domain, with no source code to audit.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://www.mixo.tech/download/MIXO-${pkgver}.AppImage"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from mixo.tech and executes it during the build phase (--appimage-extract extracts and then the entire squashfs-root is installed to /opt). The download host (mixo.tech) differs from the project's primary domain (mixo.dj), though both appear to be operated by the same Mixo company — mixo.tech is their CDN/download endpoint. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates tampering risk significantly. However, this is still a closed-source proprietary AppImage binary being executed and installed wholesale, sourced from a secondary domain. The risk is real but modest: if mixo.tech were compromised or is not actually controlled by the same entity as mixo.dj, arbitrary code would execute on the builder's machine. This fits the medium classification: an executed binary from a host that is not the canonical project domain, with no source code to audit.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Jose Riha <jose 1711 gmail com>
2# Contributor: Dimitris Kiziridis <ragouel at outlook dot com>
3
4pkgname=mixo
5pkgver=1.71.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Connect your DJ software, sync your library to all your devices, listen to your sets on your phone, and backup your library to the cloud"
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='https://www.mixo.dj'
10license=("custom:${pkgname}")
11makedepends=('gendesk')
12options=('!strip')
13noextract=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage")
14source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage::https://www.mixo.tech/download/MIXO-${pkgver}.AppImage"
15 'LICENSE')
16sha256sums=('df877806141c5c89c64178b041a00d1aeecc075252f05561c4c98b8d696e7512'
17 '84b2a88e0ca0dad3ddca2244b6300af37da7c79eb83b7dfa21457f8a72def1ee')
18package() {
19 chmod 755 ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage
20 ./${pkgname}-${pkgver}.AppImage --appimage-extract
21 install -Dm644 squashfs-root/usr/share/icons/hicolor/0x0/apps/mixo.png "${pkgdir}/usr/share/pixmaps/mixo.png"
22 gendesk -f -n --pkgname "${pkgname}" \
23 --pkgdesc "$pkgdesc" \
24 --name "MIXO" \
25 --comment "$pkgdesc" \
26 --exec "${pkgname}" \
27 --categories 'Network;Audio;AudioVideo;Application' \
28 --icon "${pkgname}"
29 install -Dm644 "${pkgname}.desktop" -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications"
30 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
31 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt"
32 cp -avR squashfs-root/ "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
33 ln -s /opt/${pkgname}/AppRun "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
34 find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} +
35 find "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}" -type f -exec chmod o-w {} +
36 install -Dm644 LICENSE -t "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
37}
38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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