mmonit

maintainer edke · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged mmonit.com is the official vendor website for the M/Monit commercial monitoring product, so this is not a random personal host — it is the canonical upstream distribution point. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary tarball directly from the vendor without any reproducibility guarantee, and the sha256sum provided gives only weak assurance (no GPG signature verification). The binary is executed as a system service (systemd unit), so a compromised or silently-replaced upstream tarball would result in code execution with system privileges. This is a standard 'prebuilt binary from vendor' pattern common in AUR, which is medium risk by convention: not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern if the vendor host or CDN were compromised. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source=(https://mmonit.com/dist/$pkgname-$pkgver-linux-x64.tar.gz \
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): mmonit.com is the official vendor website for the M/Monit commercial monitoring product, so this is not a random personal host — it is the canonical upstream distribution point. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary tarball directly from the vendor without any reproducibility guarantee, and the sha256sum provided gives only weak assurance (no GPG signature verification). The binary is executed as a system service (systemd unit), so a compromised or silently-replaced upstream tarball would result in code execution with system privileges. This is a standard 'prebuilt binary from vendor' pattern common in AUR, which is medium risk by convention: not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain concern if the vendor host or CDN were compromised. The cheaper model's MEDIUM rating is correct here.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# $Id$
2# Maintainer: Eduard Kracmar <eduard.kracmar[at]gmail[dot]com>
3
4pkgname=mmonit
5pkgver=3.7.9
6pkgrel=7
7pkgdesc="Easy, proactive monitoring of Unix systems, network and cloud services. Conduct automatic maintenance and recovery and execute meaningful causal actions in error situations."
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="http://mmonit.com/"
10license=('Commercial')
11#depends=('openssl')
12source=(https://mmonit.com/dist/$pkgname-$pkgver-linux-x64.tar.gz \
13 mmonit.service)
14backup=('opt/mmonit/conf/server.xml' 'opt/mmonit/conf/web.xml' 'opt/mmonit/db/mmonit.db')
15
16package() {
17 mkdir -p $pkgdir/opt/$pkgname || return 1
18 cp -R $srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/* $pkgdir/opt/$pkgname || return 1
19 install -D -m644 ${srcdir}/$pkgname.service ${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/$pkgname.service
20}
21
22sha256sums=('03a4fca8dc4940e0add3201b70786cee0b61faad5c034015781d48f709c7553d'
23 '9a4edf62ef3da3af1e3dcfebd7b3bb3f96e81c5a9767021f0e4ed775f2dbb469')
24

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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