mockitt
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wondershare.com (the official Wondershare vendor download domain) and installs it directly into the package tree by extracting data.tar.xz. Wondershare is a legitimate commercial software vendor and this is their official download host, so this is not an unofficial or personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary blob without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and trivially forgeable). The URL is also not pinned to a versioned path — 'ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip' is an opaque filename that could be silently replaced server-side. There is no GPG signature or SHA256/SHA512 hash. The installed binary runs with user privileges as a desktop application. This is a real supply-chain concern (weak integrity check on an executed binary from a vendor host), justifying MEDIUM, though it is not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("https://download.wondershare.com/cbs_down/ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wondershare.com (the official Wondershare vendor download domain) and installs it directly into the package tree by extracting data.tar.xz. Wondershare is a legitimate commercial software vendor and this is their official download host, so this is not an unofficial or personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary blob without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and trivially forgeable). The URL is also not pinned to a versioned path — 'ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip' is an opaque filename that could be silently replaced server-side. There is no GPG signature or SHA256/SHA512 hash. The installed binary runs with user privileges as a desktop application. This is a real supply-chain concern (weak integrity check on an executed binary from a vendor host), justifying MEDIUM, though it is not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: levinit <levinit at outlook>
pkgname=mockitt
pkgver=6.0.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A prototyping & collaboration tool.墨刀/modao/mockitt"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://mockitt.wondershare.com"
license=('custom')
#depends=('')
source=("https://download.wondershare.com/cbs_down/ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip")
md5sums=('0b24e091b750554955ea13e7aee3e5fc')
package() {
cd wondershare-ubuntu
bsdtar -xvf *Mockitt*.deb
tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C ${pkgdir}
#edit app's desktop file
echo -e '
Name[en]=Mockitt
Comment[en]=A prototyping & collaboration tool
' >>${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/mockitt.desktop
chmod -R go-w "${pkgdir}"/usr
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |