mockitt
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wondershare.com (the official Wondershare vendor download domain) and installs it directly into the package tree by extracting data.tar.xz. Wondershare is a legitimate commercial software vendor and this is their official download host, so this is not an unofficial or personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary blob without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and trivially forgeable). The URL is also not pinned to a versioned path — 'ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip' is an opaque filename that could be silently replaced server-side. There is no GPG signature or SHA256/SHA512 hash. The installed binary runs with user privileges as a desktop application. This is a real supply-chain concern (weak integrity check on an executed binary from a vendor host), justifying MEDIUM, though it is not clearly malicious.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("https://download.wondershare.com/cbs_down/ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wondershare.com (the official Wondershare vendor download domain) and installs it directly into the package tree by extracting data.tar.xz. Wondershare is a legitimate commercial software vendor and this is their official download host, so this is not an unofficial or personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary blob without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and trivially forgeable). The URL is also not pinned to a versioned path — 'ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip' is an opaque filename that could be silently replaced server-side. There is no GPG signature or SHA256/SHA512 hash. The installed binary runs with user privileges as a desktop application. This is a real supply-chain concern (weak integrity check on an executed binary from a vendor host), justifying MEDIUM, though it is not clearly malicious.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: levinit <levinit at outlook>
pkgname=mockitt
pkgver=6.0.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A prototyping & collaboration tool.墨刀/modao/mockitt"
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://mockitt.wondershare.com"
license=('custom')
#depends=('')
source=("https://download.wondershare.com/cbs_down/ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip")
md5sums=('0b24e091b750554955ea13e7aee3e5fc')
package() {
cd wondershare-ubuntu
bsdtar -xvf *Mockitt*.deb
tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C ${pkgdir}
#edit app's desktop file
echo -e '
Name[en]=Mockitt
Comment[en]=A prototyping & collaboration tool
' >>${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/mockitt.desktop
chmod -R go-w "${pkgdir}"/usr
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-11-01 00:21:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-31 00:07:41 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-30 00:29:30 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-29 00:13:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-28 00:06:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-27 00:23:28 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-26 00:12:40 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-25 00:20:48 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-24 00:14:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-23 00:02:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-22 00:13:10 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-21 00:12:50 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-20 00:10:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-19 00:03:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-18 00:06:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-17 00:21:55 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-16 00:12:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-15 00:28:05 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-14 00:06:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-10-13 00:23:45 | Medium | 2 |