mockitt

MEDIUM
maintainer levinit 4 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wondershare.com (the official Wondershare vendor download domain) and installs it directly into the package tree by extracting data.tar.xz. Wondershare is a legitimate commercial software vendor and this is their official download host, so this is not an unofficial or personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary blob without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and trivially forgeable). The URL is also not pinned to a versioned path — 'ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip' is an opaque filename that could be silently replaced server-side. There is no GPG signature or SHA256/SHA512 hash. The installed binary runs with user privileges as a desktop application. This is a real supply-chain concern (weak integrity check on an executed binary from a vendor host), justifying MEDIUM, though it is not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://download.wondershare.com/cbs_down/ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wondershare.com (the official Wondershare vendor download domain) and installs it directly into the package tree by extracting data.tar.xz. Wondershare is a legitimate commercial software vendor and this is their official download host, so this is not an unofficial or personal host. However, the package installs a prebuilt proprietary binary blob without any signature verification beyond a single MD5 checksum (which is cryptographically weak and trivially forgeable). The URL is also not pinned to a versioned path — 'ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip' is an opaque filename that could be silently replaced server-side. There is no GPG signature or SHA256/SHA512 hash. The installed binary runs with user privileges as a desktop application. This is a real supply-chain concern (weak integrity check on an executed binary from a vendor host), justifying MEDIUM, though it is not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: levinit <levinit at outlook>
2
3pkgname=mockitt
4pkgver=6.0.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="A prototyping & collaboration tool.墨刀/modao/mockitt"
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://mockitt.wondershare.com"
9license=('custom')
10#depends=('')
11source=("https://download.wondershare.com/cbs_down/ubuntu-mockitt_full8041.zip")
12
13md5sums=('0b24e091b750554955ea13e7aee3e5fc')
14
15package() {
16 cd wondershare-ubuntu
17 bsdtar -xvf *Mockitt*.deb
18 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C ${pkgdir}
19
20 #edit app's desktop file
21 echo -e '
22Name[en]=Mockitt
23Comment[en]=A prototyping & collaboration tool
24' >>${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/mockitt.desktop
25
26 chmod -R go-w "${pkgdir}"/usr
27 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
28}
29
30

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-11-01 00:21:48 Medium 2
2026-10-31 00:07:41 Medium 2
2026-10-30 00:29:30 Medium 2
2026-10-29 00:13:55 Medium 2
2026-10-28 00:06:54 Medium 2
2026-10-27 00:23:28 Medium 2
2026-10-26 00:12:40 Medium 2
2026-10-25 00:20:48 Medium 2
2026-10-24 00:14:55 Medium 2
2026-10-23 00:02:19 Medium 2
2026-10-22 00:13:10 Medium 2
2026-10-21 00:12:50 Medium 2
2026-10-20 00:10:31 Medium 2
2026-10-19 00:03:55 Medium 2
2026-10-18 00:06:55 Medium 2
2026-10-17 00:21:55 Medium 2
2026-10-16 00:12:47 Medium 2
2026-10-15 00:28:05 Medium 2
2026-10-14 00:06:47 Medium 2
2026-10-13 00:23:45 Medium 2

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