mockitt-cn
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn-release.modao.cc, which is the official CDN for the Modao/Mockitt desktop application (a legitimate Chinese prototyping tool). The URL pattern and domain are consistent with the vendor's official distribution infrastructure. However, this is still a prebuilt proprietary binary from a vendor CDN rather than source-built, and the host is not a well-known, independently verifiable platform. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at the specific version. The package extracts and installs the binary directly. This is a standard pattern for AUR packages wrapping proprietary software distributed as .deb files, but the non-standard CDN host means users must trust that cdn-release.modao.cc has not been compromised or that the maintainer's checksum is correct. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt binary from vendor CDN) rather than a clear attack, consistent with many AUR proprietary software packages.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:27
source_x86_64=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://cdn-release.modao.cc/desktop/prod-${pkgver}/linux/modao-linux-x64-${pkgver}.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from cdn-release.modao.cc, which is the official CDN for the Modao/Mockitt desktop application (a legitimate Chinese prototyping tool). The URL pattern and domain are consistent with the vendor's official distribution infrastructure. However, this is still a prebuilt proprietary binary from a vendor CDN rather than source-built, and the host is not a well-known, independently verifiable platform. The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution risk at the specific version. The package extracts and installs the binary directly. This is a standard pattern for AUR packages wrapping proprietary software distributed as .deb files, but the non-standard CDN host means users must trust that cdn-release.modao.cc has not been compromised or that the maintainer's checksum is correct. Overall this is a legitimate medium-risk pattern (prebuilt binary from vendor CDN) rather than a clear attack, consistent with many AUR proprietary software packages.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: taotieren <admin@taotieren.com>
# mockitt 墨刀中文版
pkgname=mockitt-cn
pkgver=1.5.4
pkgrel=1
arch=('x86_64')
provides=("mockitt")
conflicts=("mockitt")
pkgdesc="墨刀,让原型设计更简单, modao/mockitt 国内版本(与国际版本账户数据不互通)"
depends=(
bash
expat
dbus
gcc-libs
glib2
glibc)
makedepends=(
libarchive)
license=('LicenseRef-scancode-commercial-license')
url="https://modao.cc/feature/downloads.html"
options=(!strip !debug)
source=(
"privacy.txt"
"tos.txt"
)
source_x86_64=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.deb::https://cdn-release.modao.cc/desktop/prod-${pkgver}/linux/modao-linux-x64-${pkgver}.deb")
sha256sums=('845ceda2ba76e8dde171e28cf4347591785195fd63f8e1eef3c7b978ecba580a'
'2cbf3af6aaa6ecc240a719795f00af5f18bf11f21b35a9e381b9fb1f7ec1887c')
sha256sums_x86_64=('a8f192a2bc8a2e48248edf92d61190ef1d170e87bfa813ce09fc367f4b468459')
package() {
bsdtar -xf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" --numeric-owner -C ${pkgdir}
chown -R root:root ${pkgdir}
install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/privacy.txt -t ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/mockitt-cn/
install -Dm644 ${srcdir}/tos.txt -t ${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/mockitt-cn/
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |