modular

MEDIUM

maintainer sharktheone 3 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from dl.modular.com, which is the official Modular (the company behind Mojo/MAX) distribution host. This is a legitimate vendor CDN, not a random personal host. However, the concern is still real: a prebuilt binary from any external host (even an official vendor) carries supply-chain risk since Arch users are trusting Modular's infrastructure directly. The sha256sum is pinned to a specific version, which mitigates substitution attacks for this exact file. The main residual risk is that dl.modular.com is a proprietary vendor host with no independent verification (no GPG signature checked), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages that repackage vendor-distributed proprietary binaries — not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:17 source=("https://dl.modular.com/public/installer/deb/debian/pool/any-version/main/m/mo/modular_$pkgver/modular-v$pkgver-amd64.deb")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from dl.modular.com, which is the official Modular (the company behind Mojo/MAX) distribution host. This is a legitimate vendor CDN, not a random personal host. However, the concern is still real: a prebuilt binary from any external host (even an official vendor) carries supply-chain risk since Arch users are trusting Modular's infrastructure directly. The sha256sum is pinned to a specific version, which mitigates substitution attacks for this exact file. The main residual risk is that dl.modular.com is a proprietary vendor host with no independent verification (no GPG signature checked), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages that repackage vendor-distributed proprietary binaries — not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1#Maintainer: Sharktheone <sharktheone@proton.me>
    
      2#Contributor: Janrupf <business.janrupf@gmail.com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=modular
    
      5pkgver=0.9.2
    
      6pkgrel=2
    
      7pkgdesc="Modular installation tool - Repository: https://github.com/Sharktheone/arch-mojo"
    
      8url="https://developer.modular.com/download"
    
      9license=("custom:modular")
    
      10depends=(
    
      11    "python"
    
      12    "python-pip"
    
      13    "libxml2"
    
      14    "mojo-libs"
    
      15)
    
      16arch=("x86_64")
    
      17source=("https://dl.modular.com/public/installer/deb/debian/pool/any-version/main/m/mo/modular_$pkgver/modular-v$pkgver-amd64.deb")
    
      18sha256sums=("fabfe388c31e50bf684b321ad314e09fc348aefe2fd8da9fd33f32e3a98058d2")
    
      19
    
      20install="modular.install"
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23    bsdtar -xf data.tar -C "$pkgdir/"
    
      24}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2