modular

maintainer sharktheone · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from dl.modular.com, which is the official Modular (the company behind Mojo/MAX) distribution host. This is a legitimate vendor CDN, not a random personal host. However, the concern is still real: a prebuilt binary from any external host (even an official vendor) carries supply-chain risk since Arch users are trusting Modular's infrastructure directly. The sha256sum is pinned to a specific version, which mitigates substitution attacks for this exact file. The main residual risk is that dl.modular.com is a proprietary vendor host with no independent verification (no GPG signature checked), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages that repackage vendor-distributed proprietary binaries — not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:17 source=("https://dl.modular.com/public/installer/deb/debian/pool/any-version/main/m/mo/modular_$pkgver/modular-v$pkgver-amd64.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from dl.modular.com, which is the official Modular (the company behind Mojo/MAX) distribution host. This is a legitimate vendor CDN, not a random personal host. However, the concern is still real: a prebuilt binary from any external host (even an official vendor) carries supply-chain risk since Arch users are trusting Modular's infrastructure directly. The sha256sum is pinned to a specific version, which mitigates substitution attacks for this exact file. The main residual risk is that dl.modular.com is a proprietary vendor host with no independent verification (no GPG signature checked), and the binary is executed directly on the user's system. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages that repackage vendor-distributed proprietary binaries — not clearly malicious, but not clean either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1#Maintainer: Sharktheone <sharktheone@proton.me>
    
      2#Contributor: Janrupf <business.janrupf@gmail.com>
    
      3
    
      4pkgname=modular
    
      5pkgver=0.9.2
    
      6pkgrel=2
    
      7pkgdesc="Modular installation tool - Repository: https://github.com/Sharktheone/arch-mojo"
    
      8url="https://developer.modular.com/download"
    
      9license=("custom:modular")
    
      10depends=(
    
      11    "python"
    
      12    "python-pip"
    
      13    "libxml2"
    
      14    "mojo-libs"
    
      15)
    
      16arch=("x86_64")
    
      17source=("https://dl.modular.com/public/installer/deb/debian/pool/any-version/main/m/mo/modular_$pkgver/modular-v$pkgver-amd64.deb")
    
      18sha256sums=("fabfe388c31e50bf684b321ad314e09fc348aefe2fd8da9fd33f32e3a98058d2")
    
      19
    
      20install="modular.install"
    
      21
    
      22package() {
    
      23    bsdtar -xf data.tar -C "$pkgdir/"
    
      24}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2