motionbox-bin
The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball from an S3 bucket (omega.gg's official distribution bucket, matching the upstream vendor's own download infrastructure at omega.gg/MotionBox) with SKIP'd checksum. While omega.gg is the legitimate upstream vendor for MotionBox, using SKIP instead of a pinned sha256 means any future change to the tarball on S3 would go undetected. The binary is executed directly (/opt/MotionBox/usr/bin/MotionBox). This is a real supply-chain concern: no integrity verification on the most security-sensitive artifact (the binary). The desktop file and icon have proper checksums. The S3 host appears to be the official vendor distribution channel, not a personal/unofficial host, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — S3 bucket misconfigurations or takeovers are a known attack vector. Overall this remains a medium: executed binary with no checksum from a cloud storage host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:15
https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/omega.gg/get/MotionBox/MotionBox-$majver-$subver-linux64.tar.gz
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball from an S3 bucket (omega.gg's official distribution bucket, matching the upstream vendor's own download infrastructure at omega.gg/MotionBox) with SKIP'd checksum. While omega.gg is the legitimate upstream vendor for MotionBox, using SKIP instead of a pinned sha256 means any future change to the tarball on S3 would go undetected. The binary is executed directly (/opt/MotionBox/usr/bin/MotionBox). This is a real supply-chain concern: no integrity verification on the most security-sensitive artifact (the binary). The desktop file and icon have proper checksums. The S3 host appears to be the official vendor distribution channel, not a personal/unofficial host, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — S3 bucket misconfigurations or takeovers are a known attack vector. Overall this remains a medium: executed binary with no checksum from a cloud storage host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlightedpkgname=motionbox-bin
_pkgname=motionbox-bin
pkgver=3.0.0.3
majver=3.0.0
subver=3
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="MotionBox is a Video Browser for Motion Freedom"
arch=("x86_64")
url="http://omega.gg/MotionBox/"
license=("GPL3")
provides=("motionbox")
conflicts=("motionbox")
depends=(vlc qt6-base)
source=(
https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/omega.gg/get/MotionBox/MotionBox-$majver-$subver-linux64.tar.gz
https://github.com/G-P-L/AUR/raw/master/MotionBox/MotionBox.desktop
https://github.com/G-P-L/AUR/raw/master/MotionBox/MotionBox.png
)
sha256sums=(SKIP
'a467445d37f10dfec07fc2dbbb6d20b7fd75b215848861672839cd2760a67a21'
'7b0f4fb92e7bc5d23fbef1a0bb9381a63fa979f28a36b2f0b4b4619b13039b72')
options=(debug !strip)
package() {
install -d "$pkgdir/opt/MotionBox"
install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
# Copy files and folders from the source tarball to /opt/MotionBox/.
mv "$srcdir/MotionBox-$majver-$subver/" "$srcdir/MotionBox/"
cp -r "$srcdir/MotionBox/" "$pkgdir/opt/"
# Copy application icon to /opt/MotionBox/.
install -Dm644 MotionBox.png "$pkgdir/opt/MotionBox/MotionBox.png"
# Copy desktop launcher to /usr/share/applications/.
install -Dm644 MotionBox.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/MotionBox.desktop"
# Link binary to /usr/bin/.
ln -s /opt/MotionBox/usr/bin/MotionBox $pkgdir/usr/bin/MotionBox
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |