motionbox-bin

maintainer AnoGP · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball from an S3 bucket (omega.gg's official distribution bucket, matching the upstream vendor's own download infrastructure at omega.gg/MotionBox) with SKIP'd checksum. While omega.gg is the legitimate upstream vendor for MotionBox, using SKIP instead of a pinned sha256 means any future change to the tarball on S3 would go undetected. The binary is executed directly (/opt/MotionBox/usr/bin/MotionBox). This is a real supply-chain concern: no integrity verification on the most security-sensitive artifact (the binary). The desktop file and icon have proper checksums. The S3 host appears to be the official vendor distribution channel, not a personal/unofficial host, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — S3 bucket misconfigurations or takeovers are a known attack vector. Overall this remains a medium: executed binary with no checksum from a cloud storage host.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/omega.gg/get/MotionBox/MotionBox-$majver-$subver-linux64.tar.gz
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt binary tarball from an S3 bucket (omega.gg's official distribution bucket, matching the upstream vendor's own download infrastructure at omega.gg/MotionBox) with SKIP'd checksum. While omega.gg is the legitimate upstream vendor for MotionBox, using SKIP instead of a pinned sha256 means any future change to the tarball on S3 would go undetected. The binary is executed directly (/opt/MotionBox/usr/bin/MotionBox). This is a real supply-chain concern: no integrity verification on the most security-sensitive artifact (the binary). The desktop file and icon have proper checksums. The S3 host appears to be the official vendor distribution channel, not a personal/unofficial host, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk — S3 bucket misconfigurations or takeovers are a known attack vector. Overall this remains a medium: executed binary with no checksum from a cloud storage host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname=motionbox-bin
2_pkgname=motionbox-bin
3pkgver=3.0.0.3
4majver=3.0.0
5subver=3
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="MotionBox is a Video Browser for Motion Freedom"
8arch=("x86_64")
9url="http://omega.gg/MotionBox/"
10license=("GPL3")
11provides=("motionbox")
12conflicts=("motionbox")
13depends=(vlc qt6-base)
14source=(
15 https://s3-eu-west-1.amazonaws.com/omega.gg/get/MotionBox/MotionBox-$majver-$subver-linux64.tar.gz
16 https://github.com/G-P-L/AUR/raw/master/MotionBox/MotionBox.desktop
17 https://github.com/G-P-L/AUR/raw/master/MotionBox/MotionBox.png
18)
19sha256sums=(SKIP
20 'a467445d37f10dfec07fc2dbbb6d20b7fd75b215848861672839cd2760a67a21'
21 '7b0f4fb92e7bc5d23fbef1a0bb9381a63fa979f28a36b2f0b4b4619b13039b72')
22
23options=(debug !strip)
24
25package() {
26 install -d "$pkgdir/opt/MotionBox"
27 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
28
29 # Copy files and folders from the source tarball to /opt/MotionBox/.
30 mv "$srcdir/MotionBox-$majver-$subver/" "$srcdir/MotionBox/"
31 cp -r "$srcdir/MotionBox/" "$pkgdir/opt/"
32
33 # Copy application icon to /opt/MotionBox/.
34 install -Dm644 MotionBox.png "$pkgdir/opt/MotionBox/MotionBox.png"
35
36 # Copy desktop launcher to /usr/share/applications/.
37 install -Dm644 MotionBox.desktop "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/MotionBox.desktop"
38
39 # Link binary to /usr/bin/.
40 ln -s /opt/MotionBox/usr/bin/MotionBox $pkgdir/usr/bin/MotionBox
41}
42

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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