mqttfx-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer raymondbarbey 8 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The primary source is a prebuilt .deb fetched via web.archive.org (Wayback Machine) rather than the official vendor host (jensd.de, which appears to be defunct). While a sha256sum is provided, the Wayback Machine is not official release infrastructure and archived snapshots can theoretically be manipulated or the original could have been compromised before archival. The package installs a prebuilt binary blob (a Java application bundled as a .deb) that is executed directly from /opt, which is the core supply-chain concern regardless of the archival host. The log4jscanner/rewrite step is a positive mitigation but does not address the broader issue of an unverifiable binary from a non-official source. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/archived host with no way to verify it matches what the original vendor shipped.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 "https://web.archive.org/web/20210514230412/http://www.jensd.de/apps/${_pkgbasename}/${pkgver}/${_pkgbasename}-${pkgver}-64bit.deb"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The primary source is a prebuilt .deb fetched via web.archive.org (Wayback Machine) rather than the official vendor host (jensd.de, which appears to be defunct). While a sha256sum is provided, the Wayback Machine is not official release infrastructure and archived snapshots can theoretically be manipulated or the original could have been compromised before archival. The package installs a prebuilt binary blob (a Java application bundled as a .deb) that is executed directly from /opt, which is the core supply-chain concern regardless of the archival host. The log4jscanner/rewrite step is a positive mitigation but does not address the broader issue of an unverifiable binary from a non-official source. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unofficial/archived host with no way to verify it matches what the original vendor shipped.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Arctic Ice Studio <development@arcticicestudio.com>
2# Contributor: Arctic Ice Studio <development@arcticicestudio.com>
3# Maintainer: taotieren <admin@taotieren.com>
4
5pkgname=mqttfx-bin
6_pkgbasename=mqttfx
7pkgver=1.7.1
8pkgrel=4
9pkgdesc="A MQTT Client written in Java based on Eclipse Paho"
10arch=("x86_64")
11url="http://mqttfx.org"
12makedepends=(log4jscanner
13# unzip
14 )
15license=("Apache")
16options=("!strip")
17source=(
18 "https://web.archive.org/web/20210514230412/http://www.jensd.de/apps/${_pkgbasename}/${pkgver}/${_pkgbasename}-${pkgver}-64bit.deb"
19 "${_pkgbasename}.desktop"
20 "${_pkgbasename}.png"
21)
22sha256sums=('6fb14c739cbf8b54a373a0c5c173ef3657c01c675374ded8f0a292c610e549c2'
23 '741674f5b782aa4de0b071b7f49484b74ee2150e38b5d83eb4bd00b172978e2a'
24 '6c1b23755d3b1832ddb643b585d623128cde38e2ef42e7839141cf2106b0a59e')
25
26package() {
27 local bin_name=MQTTfx
28 cd "${srcdir}"
29
30 # Extract the application data into the package directory root
31 tar -xJf data.tar.xz -C "${pkgdir}"
32
33 # Install the binary directory and link into package
34 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
35 ln -s "/opt/${bin_name}/${bin_name}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${_pkgbasename}"
36
37 # Install the application logo and desktop launcher
38 install -Dm644 "${_pkgbasename}.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/128x128/apps/${_pkgbasename}.png"
39 install -Dm644 "${_pkgbasename}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_pkgbasename}.desktop"
40
41 # Fix log4j
42 cd "${pkgdir}/opt/${bin_name}/app/"
43# zipinfo lib/log4j-core*.jar | grep Jndi
44 log4jscanner .
45 log4jscanner --rewrite .
46# zipinfo lib/log4j-core*.jar | grep Jndi
47}
48

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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