msty-claw-bin

maintainer jeryd · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt proprietary binary (.deb) downloaded from next-assets.msty.studio, which is the vendor's own CDN/asset host for the Msty Claw application. The URL uses a query parameter (?ver=) to pin the version, and a sha256sum IS provided (not SKIP), so integrity is verified at download time. The main concern is that this is a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a non-official distribution channel (not a distro mirror or well-known release host like GitHub releases), meaning users must trust the vendor's CDN entirely. If the CDN is compromised or the vendor pushes a malicious update, the sha256 would catch it only for the pinned version — but the URL itself always fetches 'latest', so the checksum provides real protection only if the file at that URL hasn't changed. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary binary AUR packages: not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain trust concern due to the prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled host with a mutable 'latest' URL (mitigated somewhat by the sha256 check).

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 source=("$filename::https://next-assets.msty.studio/mstyclaw/latest/linux/MstyClaw_amd64.deb?ver=$pkgver")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD installs a prebuilt proprietary binary (.deb) downloaded from next-assets.msty.studio, which is the vendor's own CDN/asset host for the Msty Claw application. The URL uses a query parameter (?ver=) to pin the version, and a sha256sum IS provided (not SKIP), so integrity is verified at download time. The main concern is that this is a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a non-official distribution channel (not a distro mirror or well-known release host like GitHub releases), meaning users must trust the vendor's CDN entirely. If the CDN is compromised or the vendor pushes a malicious update, the sha256 would catch it only for the pinned version — but the URL itself always fetches 'latest', so the checksum provides real protection only if the file at that URL hasn't changed. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for proprietary binary AUR packages: not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain trust concern due to the prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled host with a mutable 'latest' URL (mitigated somewhat by the sha256 check).

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: jeryd leuck <jerydleuck@gmail.com>
2pkgname=msty-claw-bin
3pkgver=0.7.0
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Msty Claw is an autonomous AI agent application designed for complex task orchestration (Beta)"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://msty.ai/claw"
8license=('custom:proprietary')
9depends=('gtk3' 'webkit2gtk-4.1' 'openssl' 'libdbus' 'libglvnd' 'hicolor-icon-theme')
10optdepends=('cuda: NVIDIA GPU acceleration'
11 'rocm-core: AMD GPU acceleration'
12 'docker: Intel GPU acceleration (via ipex-llm container workaround)'
13 'libpulse: PulseAudio/Pipewire support')
14provides=('msty-claw')
15conflicts=('msty-claw')
16filename="MstyClaw_amd64_${pkgver}.deb"
17source=("$filename::https://next-assets.msty.studio/mstyclaw/latest/linux/MstyClaw_amd64.deb?ver=$pkgver")
18sha256sums=('d05967d6ce920b865b1b58cb6612e68b1f0426e4b00e3f07c29b89c50d83156d')
19
20prepare() {
21 mkdir -p "$srcdir/pkg-contents"
22 bsdtar -xOf "$srcdir/$filename" data.tar.gz | bsdtar -C "$srcdir/pkg-contents" -xv
23}
24
25check() {
26 find "$srcdir/pkg-contents" -type f -exec sh -c 'file "$1" | grep -q ELF' _ {} \; -print | while read -r elf; do
27 if ldd "$elf" | grep -q "not found"; then
28 echo "Broken dependencies in $elf:"
29 ldd "$elf" | grep "not found"
30 exit 1
31 fi
32 done
33}
34
35package() {
36 # Copy extracted files to pkgdir (do not preserve ownership to support container builds)
37 cp -a --no-preserve=ownership "$srcdir/pkg-contents/." "$pkgdir/"
38
39 # Create symlink for terminal access
40 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
41 ln -sf /usr/bin/MstyClaw "$pkgdir/usr/bin/msty-claw"
42
43 # Install Licenses
44 install -Dm644 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/Msty Claw/_up_/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.txt" "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.txt"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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