mts-link-meetings

maintainer asalde_le1 · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package installs a prebuilt proprietary Electron binary tarball from apps.webinar.ru. MTS Link (formerly Webinar.ru) is a Russian video-conferencing platform, and apps.webinar.ru appears to be their official distribution host for desktop clients — the URL pattern matches the product name and the domain is the legacy brand name for the same service. However, this is still a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled host with no source code available for inspection, installed directly to /opt. There are no checksums beyond sha256 of the tarball itself, and the binary runs with full user privileges as an Electron app. This is a legitimate medium-risk concern: not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt proprietary binary from a non-primary domain that cannot be independently verified beyond the hash. The sha256sum provides integrity but not authenticity (no GPG signature). This is a standard pattern for proprietary AUR packages but the non-primary domain (apps.webinar.ru vs mts-link.ru) adds marginal supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:28 https://apps.webinar.ru/desktop/mts-link-${pkgver}.tar.gz
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package installs a prebuilt proprietary Electron binary tarball from apps.webinar.ru. MTS Link (formerly Webinar.ru) is a Russian video-conferencing platform, and apps.webinar.ru appears to be their official distribution host for desktop clients — the URL pattern matches the product name and the domain is the legacy brand name for the same service. However, this is still a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled host with no source code available for inspection, installed directly to /opt. There are no checksums beyond sha256 of the tarball itself, and the binary runs with full user privileges as an Electron app. This is a legitimate medium-risk concern: not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt proprietary binary from a non-primary domain that cannot be independently verified beyond the hash. The sha256sum provides integrity but not authenticity (no GPG signature). This is a standard pattern for proprietary AUR packages but the non-primary domain (apps.webinar.ru vs mts-link.ru) adds marginal supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: asalde_le1 <asalde.le1@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=mts-link-meetings
4pkgver=1.2.13
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='MTS Link Meetings desktop application based on Electron and React'
7arch=(x86_64)
8url='https://mts-link.ru'
9license=(custom:proprietary)
10changelog=${pkgname}.changelog
11replaces=('mts-link')
12depends=(
13 alsa-lib
14 at-spi2-core
15 gtk3
16 libnotify
17 libsecret
18 libuuid.so=1-64
19 libxss
20 libxtst
21 nss
22 xdg-utils
23)
24optdepends=(
25 'libappindicator-gtk3: Systray indicator support'
26)
27source=(
28 https://apps.webinar.ru/desktop/mts-link-${pkgver}.tar.gz
29 mts-link-meetings.desktop
30)
31sha256sums=('111161ab96822923e4352cd2523f57cc2bf7f5b76c9d5e654cc12b11cf567295'
32 'e1de286d013a8c0bba6fe44a8f4138a68d600835b5320b3ab2bbb29b0c5cbb2e')
33
34package() {
35 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
36 cp -r "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-desktop/"* "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
37
38 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
39 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
40
41 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
42
43 install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps"
44 ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/resources/assets/icon.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps/${pkgname}.png"
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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