mts-link-meetings
The package installs a prebuilt proprietary Electron binary tarball from apps.webinar.ru. MTS Link (formerly Webinar.ru) is a Russian video-conferencing platform, and apps.webinar.ru appears to be their official distribution host for desktop clients — the URL pattern matches the product name and the domain is the legacy brand name for the same service. However, this is still a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled host with no source code available for inspection, installed directly to /opt. There are no checksums beyond sha256 of the tarball itself, and the binary runs with full user privileges as an Electron app. This is a legitimate medium-risk concern: not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt proprietary binary from a non-primary domain that cannot be independently verified beyond the hash. The sha256sum provides integrity but not authenticity (no GPG signature). This is a standard pattern for proprietary AUR packages but the non-primary domain (apps.webinar.ru vs mts-link.ru) adds marginal supply-chain risk.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:28
https://apps.webinar.ru/desktop/mts-link-${pkgver}.tar.gz
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package installs a prebuilt proprietary Electron binary tarball from apps.webinar.ru. MTS Link (formerly Webinar.ru) is a Russian video-conferencing platform, and apps.webinar.ru appears to be their official distribution host for desktop clients — the URL pattern matches the product name and the domain is the legacy brand name for the same service. However, this is still a closed-source, prebuilt binary from a vendor-controlled host with no source code available for inspection, installed directly to /opt. There are no checksums beyond sha256 of the tarball itself, and the binary runs with full user privileges as an Electron app. This is a legitimate medium-risk concern: not clearly malicious, but a prebuilt proprietary binary from a non-primary domain that cannot be independently verified beyond the hash. The sha256sum provides integrity but not authenticity (no GPG signature). This is a standard pattern for proprietary AUR packages but the non-primary domain (apps.webinar.ru vs mts-link.ru) adds marginal supply-chain risk.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: asalde_le1 <asalde.le1@gmail.com>
pkgname=mts-link-meetings
pkgver=1.2.13
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='MTS Link Meetings desktop application based on Electron and React'
arch=(x86_64)
url='https://mts-link.ru'
license=(custom:proprietary)
changelog=${pkgname}.changelog
replaces=('mts-link')
depends=(
alsa-lib
at-spi2-core
gtk3
libnotify
libsecret
libuuid.so=1-64
libxss
libxtst
nss
xdg-utils
)
optdepends=(
'libappindicator-gtk3: Systray indicator support'
)
source=(
https://apps.webinar.ru/desktop/mts-link-${pkgver}.tar.gz
mts-link-meetings.desktop
)
sha256sums=('111161ab96822923e4352cd2523f57cc2bf7f5b76c9d5e654cc12b11cf567295'
'e1de286d013a8c0bba6fe44a8f4138a68d600835b5320b3ab2bbb29b0c5cbb2e')
package() {
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
cp -r "${srcdir}/${pkgname}-desktop/"* "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/bin"
ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/${pkgname}" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/${pkgname}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${pkgname}.desktop"
install -dm755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps"
ln -s "/opt/${pkgname}/resources/assets/icon.png" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/512x512/apps/${pkgname}.png"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |