multiverse
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution service (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging/distribution platform used by many commercial products). The binary is installed directly as an executable without extraction or verification beyond a sha1sum. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and this appears to be the official distribution channel for Multiverse (the tabletop RPG platform), it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's a third-party host. The sha1sum provides some integrity guarantee but SHA1 is weak for security purposes. The core concern is that an AppImage is a self-contained executable bundle installed directly to /usr/bin, and its provenance depends entirely on the security of the todesktop.com distribution infrastructure. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-first-party host with weak integrity checking.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:15
source_x86_64=("https://download.todesktop.com/2101156wuvac7e1/One-More-Multiverse-${pkgver}.AppImage")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution service (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging/distribution platform used by many commercial products). The binary is installed directly as an executable without extraction or verification beyond a sha1sum. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and this appears to be the official distribution channel for Multiverse (the tabletop RPG platform), it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's a third-party host. The sha1sum provides some integrity guarantee but SHA1 is weak for security purposes. The core concern is that an AppImage is a self-contained executable bundle installed directly to /usr/bin, and its provenance depends entirely on the security of the todesktop.com distribution infrastructure. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-first-party host with weak integrity checking.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Eric Engestrom <aur [at] engestrom [dot] ch>
pkgname=multiverse
pkgver=1.2.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Online video game platform making it as easy as possible to make, play, stream, and share tabletop role-playing games'
url='https://multiverse.com'
arch=('x86_64')
license=('unknown')
source=('multiverse.desktop'
'multiverse.svg')
sha1sums=('823098589a6cdbe3e298f4e38d488e82f8610699'
'9aadec2fdce3c6c8699f860a3d35464c6d5f1d22')
sha1sums_x86_64=('5e24b86bba65d644fb34e1c2d7879f7bf2a49be2')
source_x86_64=("https://download.todesktop.com/2101156wuvac7e1/One-More-Multiverse-${pkgver}.AppImage")
options=('!strip')
package() {
# App
install -dm755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
install -m755 *.AppImage "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/multiverse
# Desktop shortcut
install -Dm644 multiverse.desktop "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/multiverse.desktop
install -Dm644 multiverse.svg "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/multiverse.svg
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |