multiverse

maintainer Hate9 · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution service (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging/distribution platform used by many commercial products). The binary is installed directly as an executable without extraction or verification beyond a sha1sum. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and this appears to be the official distribution channel for Multiverse (the tabletop RPG platform), it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's a third-party host. The sha1sum provides some integrity guarantee but SHA1 is weak for security purposes. The core concern is that an AppImage is a self-contained executable bundle installed directly to /usr/bin, and its provenance depends entirely on the security of the todesktop.com distribution infrastructure. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-first-party host with weak integrity checking.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source_x86_64=("https://download.todesktop.com/2101156wuvac7e1/One-More-Multiverse-${pkgver}.AppImage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from download.todesktop.com, which is a third-party app distribution service (ToDesktop is a legitimate Electron app packaging/distribution platform used by many commercial products). The binary is installed directly as an executable without extraction or verification beyond a sha1sum. While ToDesktop is a real commercial service and this appears to be the official distribution channel for Multiverse (the tabletop RPG platform), it is not the upstream vendor's own infrastructure — it's a third-party host. The sha1sum provides some integrity guarantee but SHA1 is weak for security purposes. The core concern is that an AppImage is a self-contained executable bundle installed directly to /usr/bin, and its provenance depends entirely on the security of the todesktop.com distribution infrastructure. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: not clearly malicious, but an executed binary from a non-first-party host with weak integrity checking.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Eric Engestrom <aur [at] engestrom [dot] ch>
2
3pkgname=multiverse
4pkgver=1.2.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc='Online video game platform making it as easy as possible to make, play, stream, and share tabletop role-playing games'
7url='https://multiverse.com'
8arch=('x86_64')
9license=('unknown')
10source=('multiverse.desktop'
11 'multiverse.svg')
12sha1sums=('823098589a6cdbe3e298f4e38d488e82f8610699'
13 '9aadec2fdce3c6c8699f860a3d35464c6d5f1d22')
14sha1sums_x86_64=('5e24b86bba65d644fb34e1c2d7879f7bf2a49be2')
15source_x86_64=("https://download.todesktop.com/2101156wuvac7e1/One-More-Multiverse-${pkgver}.AppImage")
16options=('!strip')
17
18package() {
19 # App
20 install -dm755 "$pkgdir"/usr/bin
21 install -m755 *.AppImage "$pkgdir"/usr/bin/multiverse
22
23 # Desktop shortcut
24 install -Dm644 multiverse.desktop "$pkgdir"/usr/share/applications/multiverse.desktop
25 install -Dm644 multiverse.svg "$pkgdir"/usr/share/pixmaps/multiverse.svg
26}
27

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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