multiwerf-bin

maintainer orphaned · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from Yandex Cloud Storage (storage.yandexcloud.net/multiwerf/...). While this is actually the official distribution host used by the werf/multiwerf project (Flant, the company behind werf, uses Yandex Cloud for their release artifacts), it is not a GitHub Releases URL and could be considered non-standard from a packaging perspective. The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin. The integrity check uses only MD5, which is cryptographically weak. However, Yandex Cloud Storage is the documented official distribution channel for multiwerf (as stated in the project's own README), so this is not truly an unofficial or personal host — it is the vendor's chosen CDN. The risk is real but limited: if Yandex Cloud Storage were compromised or the object replaced, the MD5 check would not reliably catch a collision attack. Overall this is a borderline case: the host is the official vendor host, but the weak checksum and binary-only distribution without signature verification keep it at medium rather than clean.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=('https://storage.yandexcloud.net/multiwerf/targets/releases/v1.4.9/multiwerf-linux-amd64-v1.4.9')
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 75%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary from Yandex Cloud Storage (storage.yandexcloud.net/multiwerf/...). While this is actually the official distribution host used by the werf/multiwerf project (Flant, the company behind werf, uses Yandex Cloud for their release artifacts), it is not a GitHub Releases URL and could be considered non-standard from a packaging perspective. The binary is executed directly and installed to /usr/bin. The integrity check uses only MD5, which is cryptographically weak. However, Yandex Cloud Storage is the documented official distribution channel for multiwerf (as stated in the project's own README), so this is not truly an unofficial or personal host — it is the vendor's chosen CDN. The risk is real but limited: if Yandex Cloud Storage were compromised or the object replaced, the MD5 check would not reliably catch a collision attack. Overall this is a borderline case: the host is the official vendor host, but the weak checksum and binary-only distribution without signature verification keep it at medium rather than clean.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Ruben Gees <rubengees7@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=multiwerf-bin
4pkgver=1.4.9
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="multiwerf is a self-updatable werf manager with the awareness of release channels, allowed stability levels."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://github.com/werf/multiwerf"
9license=('Apache')
10depends=('wget')
11source=('https://storage.yandexcloud.net/multiwerf/targets/releases/v1.4.9/multiwerf-linux-amd64-v1.4.9')
12md5sums=('17b1beeff6f9957929189d16c67831ce')
13
14package() {
15 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}"/multiwerf-* "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/multiwerf"
16}
17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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