mumax3

maintainer kahlos · 3 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing mumax3, mumax3-server, mumax3-convert) from mumax.ugent.be — the official distribution host for the mumax3 project from Ghent University, which is the upstream developer. The binaries are installed directly to /opt/mumax3 and executed at runtime. While the host is the legitimate upstream (not a personal/unofficial mirror), it is still a prebuilt binary rather than source-compiled, and the host is not a major well-known distribution channel. The sha256 checksums are present and verify the download. The concern is real but mild: if the upstream host were compromised, users would execute malicious GPU simulation binaries with CUDA/NVIDIA access. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages distributing prebuilt binaries from upstream vendor hosts — not clearly malicious, but not source-built either.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://mumax.ugent.be/mumax3-binaries/mumax3.10_linux_cuda11.0.tar.gz"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing mumax3, mumax3-server, mumax3-convert) from mumax.ugent.be — the official distribution host for the mumax3 project from Ghent University, which is the upstream developer. The binaries are installed directly to /opt/mumax3 and executed at runtime. While the host is the legitimate upstream (not a personal/unofficial mirror), it is still a prebuilt binary rather than source-compiled, and the host is not a major well-known distribution channel. The sha256 checksums are present and verify the download. The concern is real but mild: if the upstream host were compromised, users would execute malicious GPU simulation binaries with CUDA/NVIDIA access. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for AUR packages distributing prebuilt binaries from upstream vendor hosts — not clearly malicious, but not source-built either.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Callum Vincent <kahlos@gmail.com>
2pkgname=mumax3
3pkgver=3.10
4pkgrel='1'
5pkgdesc="GPU-accelerated micromagnetic simulation program"
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://mumax.github.io/"
8license=('GPL')
9depends=('cuda>=11.0' 'nvidia>=450.36.06')
10optdepends=('gnuplot: for plots in the web GUI')
11source=("https://mumax.ugent.be/mumax3-binaries/mumax3.10_linux_cuda11.0.tar.gz"
12 mumax3-user.conf
13 mumax3-dir.conf
14 mumax3@.service)
15sha256sums=('4c03533986dbf2a9cd7f9708c2f32e4e1ca849bb300e7b0946fdf50daf0a2694'
16 'bde08909ca59497cfb05686e0ec1a43dc08f499a59861e96cac0d1412545321a'
17 '0ddad9502bc15cf7e6918c4c83cae8fa909f25b17120cbdf9fad8ba47ee18449'
18 '515cf6447368b8f03a8392ee54fe35b3bd6e3a91f8de3ebbc2fd8403310d6d8d')
19
20install=mumax3.install
21
22package() {
23 mkdir -p ${pkgdir}/opt/mumax3/
24 cp ${srcdir}/mumax3.10_linux_cuda11.0/mumax3{,-server,-convert} ${pkgdir}/opt/mumax3
25 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname-user.conf" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/sysusers.d/mumax3.conf"
26 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname-dir.conf" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/mumax3.conf"
27 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/mumax3@.service" "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/mumax3@.service"
28}
29

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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