mybackup

maintainer leledumbo · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing executables installed under /usr) from rerware.com over HTTPS. While rerware.com appears to be the official vendor site for MyBackup, the integrity check is only an MD5 sum (no PGP signature, no SHA-256), and the download URL is a dynamic ASP.NET endpoint (DownloadFile.aspx with query parameters) rather than a static versioned release artifact. This means the server could silently serve different content without changing the URL, and MD5 is trivially collisible. The package installs executed binaries/JARs directly from this tarball. This is a real supply-chain concern: no strong integrity guarantee on an executed binary from a third-party host, even if that host is the nominal vendor. Not clearly malicious, but the weak integrity check on an executed binary warrants medium severity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=('mybackuplinux.tar::https://www.rerware.com/MyBackupPC/DownloadFile.aspx?os=8&flv=3&v=144')

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing executables installed under /usr) from rerware.com over HTTPS. While rerware.com appears to be the official vendor site for MyBackup, the integrity check is only an MD5 sum (no PGP signature, no SHA-256), and the download URL is a dynamic ASP.NET endpoint (DownloadFile.aspx with query parameters) rather than a static versioned release artifact. This means the server could silently serve different content without changing the URL, and MD5 is trivially collisible. The package installs executed binaries/JARs directly from this tarball. This is a real supply-chain concern: no strong integrity guarantee on an executed binary from a third-party host, even if that host is the nominal vendor. Not clearly malicious, but the weak integrity check on an executed binary warrants medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Mario Ray Mahardhika <leledumbo_cool@yahoo.co.id>
    
      2pkgname=mybackup
    
      3pkgver=v144
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="The best Android backup tool with PC integration."
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://www.rerware.com/"
    
      8license=('custom')
    
      9makedepends=()
    
      10depends=('java-environment' 'bash')
    
      11source=('mybackuplinux.tar::https://www.rerware.com/MyBackupPC/DownloadFile.aspx?os=8&flv=3&v=144')
    
      12md5sums=('b37a1982902111f9cf615a88a67da820')
    
      13
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  cp -Rfp $srcdir/usr $srcdir/etc $pkgdir/
    
      17}
    
      18

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2