mybackup

MEDIUM

maintainer leledumbo 0 votes scanned 2026-11-01 00:21:48.120785

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing executables installed under /usr) from rerware.com over HTTPS. While rerware.com appears to be the official vendor site for MyBackup, the integrity check is only an MD5 sum (no PGP signature, no SHA-256), and the download URL is a dynamic ASP.NET endpoint (DownloadFile.aspx with query parameters) rather than a static versioned release artifact. This means the server could silently serve different content without changing the URL, and MD5 is trivially collisible. The package installs executed binaries/JARs directly from this tarball. This is a real supply-chain concern: no strong integrity guarantee on an executed binary from a third-party host, even if that host is the nominal vendor. Not clearly malicious, but the weak integrity check on an executed binary warrants medium severity.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:11 source=('mybackuplinux.tar::https://www.rerware.com/MyBackupPC/DownloadFile.aspx?os=8&flv=3&v=144')

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (containing executables installed under /usr) from rerware.com over HTTPS. While rerware.com appears to be the official vendor site for MyBackup, the integrity check is only an MD5 sum (no PGP signature, no SHA-256), and the download URL is a dynamic ASP.NET endpoint (DownloadFile.aspx with query parameters) rather than a static versioned release artifact. This means the server could silently serve different content without changing the URL, and MD5 is trivially collisible. The package installs executed binaries/JARs directly from this tarball. This is a real supply-chain concern: no strong integrity guarantee on an executed binary from a third-party host, even if that host is the nominal vendor. Not clearly malicious, but the weak integrity check on an executed binary warrants medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Mario Ray Mahardhika <leledumbo_cool@yahoo.co.id>
    
      2pkgname=mybackup
    
      3pkgver=v144
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="The best Android backup tool with PC integration."
    
      6arch=('x86_64')
    
      7url="https://www.rerware.com/"
    
      8license=('custom')
    
      9makedepends=()
    
      10depends=('java-environment' 'bash')
    
      11source=('mybackuplinux.tar::https://www.rerware.com/MyBackupPC/DownloadFile.aspx?os=8&flv=3&v=144')
    
      12md5sums=('b37a1982902111f9cf615a88a67da820')
    
      13
    
      14
    
      15package() {
    
      16  cp -Rfp $srcdir/usr $srcdir/etc $pkgdir/
    
      17}
    
      18

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-11-01 00:21:48	Medium	2
2026-10-31 00:07:41	Medium	2
2026-10-30 00:29:30	Medium	2
2026-10-29 00:13:55	Medium	2
2026-10-28 00:06:54	Medium	2
2026-10-27 00:23:28	Medium	2
2026-10-26 00:12:40	Medium	2
2026-10-25 00:20:48	Medium	2
2026-10-24 00:14:55	Medium	2
2026-10-23 00:02:19	Medium	2
2026-10-22 00:13:10	Medium	2
2026-10-21 00:12:50	Medium	2
2026-10-20 00:10:31	Medium	2
2026-10-19 00:03:55	Medium	2
2026-10-18 00:06:55	Medium	2
2026-10-17 00:21:55	Medium	2
2026-10-16 00:12:47	Medium	2
2026-10-15 00:28:05	Medium	2
2026-10-14 00:06:47	Medium	2
2026-10-13 00:23:45	Medium	2