myoffice-standard-home-edition-bin
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from preset.myoffice-app.ru, which appears to be an official distribution host for MyOffice (a Russian office suite by New Cloud Technologies). The domain myoffice-app.ru is plausibly an official CDN/preset distribution endpoint for the vendor (myoffice.ru). However, it is not the primary vendor domain, and there is no way to independently verify this is an official mirror vs. a third-party host. The .deb is extracted and its binaries are installed directly onto the system. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates tampering risk for the specific version pinned, but does not address the risk of the host being compromised and serving a different file in the future (the URL is not versioned — it points to a static filename 'MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb' without a version path component, meaning the checksum would catch substitution only for this build). The package installs executed code (a full office suite with Qt5, Mono, etc.) from a non-primary vendor host with a non-versioned URL. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: medium severity is appropriate.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:18
source=("${_my_pkg}-${pkgver}.deb::https://preset.myoffice-app.ru/MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from preset.myoffice-app.ru, which appears to be an official distribution host for MyOffice (a Russian office suite by New Cloud Technologies). The domain myoffice-app.ru is plausibly an official CDN/preset distribution endpoint for the vendor (myoffice.ru). However, it is not the primary vendor domain, and there is no way to independently verify this is an official mirror vs. a third-party host. The .deb is extracted and its binaries are installed directly onto the system. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates tampering risk for the specific version pinned, but does not address the risk of the host being compromised and serving a different file in the future (the URL is not versioned — it points to a static filename 'MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb' without a version path component, meaning the checksum would catch substitution only for this build). The package installs executed code (a full office suite with Qt5, Mono, etc.) from a non-primary vendor host with a non-versioned URL. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: medium severity is appropriate.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Stezkoy
_my_pkg=myoffice-standard-home-edition
pkgname=${_my_pkg}-bin
pkgver=26.1.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A set of office applications for creating text and spreadsheet documents. Home edition."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://myoffice.ru/products/standard-home-edition/"
license=('EULA')
groups=('myoffice')
depends=('fontconfig' 'freetype2' 'glib2' 'hunspell' 'krb5' 'libcups' 'libglvnd' 'libpng' 'libpulse'
'libx11' 'libxcb' 'libxext' 'libxkbcommon' 'libxkbcommon-x11' 'libxrender' 'link-grammar' 'lua'
'mono' 'openssl-1.1' 'pcre2' 'pixman' 'qt5-base' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-svg' 'zlib' 'bc')
options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
install=${pkgname}.install
source=("${_my_pkg}-${pkgver}.deb::https://preset.myoffice-app.ru/MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb")
sha256sums=('91a6d5b1d0cccc3b6773148357dc0c045f6727e5fbdd2e6cad9572f336273644')
package(){
tar xzf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_my_pkg}/Resources/UI/ru/LicenseAgreements.rcc" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |