myoffice-standard-home-edition-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer Stezko 10 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from preset.myoffice-app.ru, which appears to be an official distribution host for MyOffice (a Russian office suite by New Cloud Technologies). The domain myoffice-app.ru is plausibly an official CDN/preset distribution endpoint for the vendor (myoffice.ru). However, it is not the primary vendor domain, and there is no way to independently verify this is an official mirror vs. a third-party host. The .deb is extracted and its binaries are installed directly onto the system. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates tampering risk for the specific version pinned, but does not address the risk of the host being compromised and serving a different file in the future (the URL is not versioned — it points to a static filename 'MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb' without a version path component, meaning the checksum would catch substitution only for this build). The package installs executed code (a full office suite with Qt5, Mono, etc.) from a non-primary vendor host with a non-versioned URL. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: medium severity is appropriate.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:18 source=("${_my_pkg}-${pkgver}.deb::https://preset.myoffice-app.ru/MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from preset.myoffice-app.ru, which appears to be an official distribution host for MyOffice (a Russian office suite by New Cloud Technologies). The domain myoffice-app.ru is plausibly an official CDN/preset distribution endpoint for the vendor (myoffice.ru). However, it is not the primary vendor domain, and there is no way to independently verify this is an official mirror vs. a third-party host. The .deb is extracted and its binaries are installed directly onto the system. A sha256 checksum is present, which mitigates tampering risk for the specific version pinned, but does not address the risk of the host being compromised and serving a different file in the future (the URL is not versioned — it points to a static filename 'MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb' without a version path component, meaning the checksum would catch substitution only for this build). The package installs executed code (a full office suite with Qt5, Mono, etc.) from a non-primary vendor host with a non-versioned URL. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: medium severity is appropriate.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Stezkoy
2
3_my_pkg=myoffice-standard-home-edition
4pkgname=${_my_pkg}-bin
5pkgver=26.1.0
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="A set of office applications for creating text and spreadsheet documents. Home edition."
8arch=('x86_64')
9url="https://myoffice.ru/products/standard-home-edition/"
10license=('EULA')
11groups=('myoffice')
12depends=('fontconfig' 'freetype2' 'glib2' 'hunspell' 'krb5' 'libcups' 'libglvnd' 'libpng' 'libpulse'
13 'libx11' 'libxcb' 'libxext' 'libxkbcommon' 'libxkbcommon-x11' 'libxrender' 'link-grammar' 'lua'
14 'mono' 'openssl-1.1' 'pcre2' 'pixman' 'qt5-base' 'qt5-multimedia' 'qt5-svg' 'zlib' 'bc')
15options=('!strip' '!emptydirs')
16install=${pkgname}.install
17
18source=("${_my_pkg}-${pkgver}.deb::https://preset.myoffice-app.ru/MyOfficeStandardHomeEdition.deb")
19sha256sums=('91a6d5b1d0cccc3b6773148357dc0c045f6727e5fbdd2e6cad9572f336273644')
20
21package(){
22 tar xzf data.tar.gz -C "${pkgdir}"
23 install -D -m644 "${pkgdir}/opt/${_my_pkg}/Resources/UI/ru/LicenseAgreements.rcc" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/LICENSE"
24}
25

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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