nemerle

MEDIUM
maintainer veramagalhaes 8 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
View on AUR
Why flagged

The package downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP archive (NemerleBinaries-net-4.0-v1.2.507.0.zip) from nemerle.org, which is the official project website for the Nemerle language. This is not a personal or unofficial host — it is the canonical upstream distribution point. However, the concern is real in a supply-chain sense: the download is a prebuilt binary bundle (compiled .NET assemblies/executables) rather than source code, and the integrity check is only an MD5 sum (weak, collision-prone). The binaries are installed to /opt/nemerle and executed via wrapper scripts. If nemerle.org were compromised or the specific nightly build URL were tampered with, arbitrary .NET code would execute on the user's system. The nightly/build-numbered URL path also means this is not a stable release artifact. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from an upstream host with only MD5 verification, not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:16 "http://nemerle.org/Download/Nightly%20master-NET40-VS2010/build-${_build}/NemerleBinaries-net-4.0-v${pkgver}.zip"
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary ZIP archive (NemerleBinaries-net-4.0-v1.2.507.0.zip) from nemerle.org, which is the official project website for the Nemerle language. This is not a personal or unofficial host — it is the canonical upstream distribution point. However, the concern is real in a supply-chain sense: the download is a prebuilt binary bundle (compiled .NET assemblies/executables) rather than source code, and the integrity check is only an MD5 sum (weak, collision-prone). The binaries are installed to /opt/nemerle and executed via wrapper scripts. If nemerle.org were compromised or the specific nightly build URL were tampered with, arbitrary .NET code would execute on the user's system. The nightly/build-numbered URL path also means this is not a stable release artifact. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: prebuilt binaries from an upstream host with only MD5 verification, not a false positive, but also not clearly malicious.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Mort Yao <soi@mort.ninja>
2# Contributor: Karol 'Kenji Takahashi' Woźniak <kenji.sx>
3# Contributor: William Rea <sillywilly@gmail.com>
4# Contributor: Fabio 'Feanor' Falcinelli <fabio.falcinelli@gmail.com>
5
6pkgname=nemerle
7pkgver=1.2.507.0
8pkgrel=1
9_build=272
10pkgdesc="A high-level statically-typed programming language for the .NET platform."
11url="http://www.nemerle.org"
12license=("nemerle")
13depends=('mono')
14arch=('i686' 'x86_64')
15source=(
16"http://nemerle.org/Download/Nightly%20master-NET40-VS2010/build-${_build}/NemerleBinaries-net-4.0-v${pkgver}.zip"
17"https://raw.github.com/rsdn/nemerle/v1.2/License.rtf"
18"ncc"
19"nemish"
20)
21md5sums=('038ae2cce87d67b7a27619c0d352236e'
22 'f28530ac505daf378a44af822b25f7f5'
23 '0bc83af0aac196f43c8f0907b64625bb'
24 '87b26931a597f99bb0aca67a82cafc0a')
25
26package() {
27 cd ${srcdir}
28
29 install -d -m755 "${pkgdir}/opt/nemerle"
30
31 ls . | grep -v "NemerleBinaries-net-4.0-v${pkgver}.zip\|License.rtf" | xargs cp -v -t "${pkgdir}/opt/nemerle"
32
33 install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/ncc" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/ncc"
34 install -D -m755 "${srcdir}/nemish" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/nemish"
35 install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/License.rtf" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}/License.rtf"
36}
37

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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