ni-daqmx-base-bin
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:13
source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.iso::https://download.ni.com/support/softlib/multifunction_daq/nidaqmxbase/${pkgver%.*}/linux/nidaqmxbase-${pkgver}.iso")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt ISO from download.ni.com, which is National Instruments' (now NI/Emerson) official software distribution domain — this is the legitimate vendor host for NI-DAQmx Base. The ISO contains RPMs that are extracted and installed under /opt. While the host is the official NI download server (not a personal or unofficial host), the package installs prebuilt binary RPMs without source code, and the extraction logic is somewhat sloppy (cp -a * copies everything including leftover artifacts). The sha256sum is present and pinned. The main concern is that binary-only driver software from a closed-source vendor is being extracted and placed under /opt without any integrity verification of individual RPMs beyond the ISO checksum. This is a legitimate medium-risk supply-chain concern: executed binary code from a closed-source vendor with no source verification, though the host itself is the official NI distribution server. Not high because there is no evidence of malice, obfuscation, or unofficial hosting.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlightedpkgname=ni-daqmx-base-bin
pkgver=15.0.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="a subset of NI-DAQmx functionality for your data acquisition system"
arch=(x86_64)
url="https://www.ni.com/en-gb/support/downloads/drivers/download.ni-daqmx-base.html#326057"
license=(custom)
depends=(
)
makedepends=(
)
options=(!strip)
source=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.iso::https://download.ni.com/support/softlib/multifunction_daq/nidaqmxbase/${pkgver%.*}/linux/nidaqmxbase-${pkgver}.iso")
sha256sums=('594b1c07093be56fdfec783b224bd5db2c5509b95e0d30475dd5342b6efb97fa')
prepare(){
rm -f *.i386.rpm
rm *.iso
}
package(){
install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
install -m644 -Dt "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}" -m644 LICENSE.txt
for rpmf in *.rpm; do
mv ${rpmf} ${rpmf}-ext
mkdir "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${rpmf}"
pushd "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}/${rpmf}"
bsdtar -xvf "${srcdir}/${rpmf}-ext"
popd
rm -f ${rpmf}-ext
done
cp -a * "${pkgdir}/opt/${pkgname}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-08-03 00:08:14 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-02 00:16:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-08-01 00:11:18 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-31 00:14:10 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-30 00:17:23 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-29 00:25:53 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-28 00:07:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-27 00:24:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-26 00:07:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-25 00:13:44 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-24 00:02:28 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-23 00:14:47 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-22 00:29:32 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-21 00:24:15 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-20 00:19:49 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-19 00:17:08 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-18 00:14:48 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-17 00:06:16 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-16 00:05:41 | MEDIUM | 2 |
| 2026-07-15 00:09:25 | MEDIUM | 2 |