nightlight-bin

maintainer retcinder · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron application binary (.deb) from assets.night-light.cz, which is a subdomain of the project's own domain (nightlightapp.net is the official URL, night-light.cz appears to be the same project's asset CDN). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at download time. However, this is still a prebuilt binary from a relatively obscure/small project hosted on what appears to be a personal/project CDN rather than a major distribution channel (GitHub releases, etc.). The Electron app is installed wholesale via 'cp -r ./* $pkgdir' with no further verification. The risk is real but not elevated beyond a standard medium: a pinned hash prevents silent substitution, but the host is not a well-known official release infrastructure and the binary is executed code. The cheaper model's assessment is correct at medium severity.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:26 source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb::https://assets.night-light.cz/nightlight_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt Electron application binary (.deb) from assets.night-light.cz, which is a subdomain of the project's own domain (nightlightapp.net is the official URL, night-light.cz appears to be the same project's asset CDN). The sha256sum is pinned, which mitigates substitution attacks at download time. However, this is still a prebuilt binary from a relatively obscure/small project hosted on what appears to be a personal/project CDN rather than a major distribution channel (GitHub releases, etc.). The Electron app is installed wholesale via 'cp -r ./* $pkgdir' with no further verification. The risk is real but not elevated beyond a standard medium: a pinned hash prevents silent substitution, but the host is not a well-known official release infrastructure and the binary is executed code. The cheaper model's assessment is correct at medium severity.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Tulpenkiste <tulpenkiste at the amogus email domain which is .cloud>
    
      2pkgname=nightlight-bin
    
      3pkgver=1.0.1
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Experience a new way of connecting with like-minded people on Nightlight, a free social media platform that values inclusivity, customization, and an ad-free environment."
    
      6
    
      7provides=(nightlight)
    
      8conflicts=(nightlight)
    
      9
    
      10arch=('x86_64')
    
      11
    
      12url="https://nightlightapp.net/"
    
      13
    
      14# Electron's dependencies, as Nightlight ships with a vendored
    
      15depends=(
    
      16	c-ares
    
      17	gcc-libs # libgcc_s.so
    
      18	glibc # libc.so libm.so
    
      19	gtk3 libgtk-3.so
    
      20	libevent
    
      21	libffi libffi.so
    
      22	nss # libnss3.so
    
      23	zlib libz.so
    
      24)
    
      25
    
      26source=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb::https://assets.night-light.cz/nightlight_${pkgver}_amd64.deb")
    
      27sha256sums=('9121387bc2709c88c8a1fc3b09d9ef1b60426e0b5ca251c21700c2c8316bca06')
    
      28
    
      29noextract=("$pkgname-$pkgver.deb")
    
      30
    
      31prepare() {
    
      32	if [[ -d tmp ]]; then
    
      33		rm -rf tmp
    
      34	fi
    
      35
    
      36	mkdir tmp
    
      37	mkdir -p "$pkgname-$pkgver"
    
      38	ar x --output tmp "./$pkgname-$pkgver.deb"
    
      39
    
      40	tar -xf tmp/data.tar.xz -C "$srcdir/$pkgname-$pkgver/"
    
      41}
    
      42
    
      43package() {
    
      44	cd "$pkgname-$pkgver/"
    
      45
    
      46	cp -r ./* "$pkgdir"
    
      47}
    
      48

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2