nodejs-editly-git

MEDIUM

maintainer soloturn 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

View on AUR

Why flagged

The PKGBUILD installs directly from a live Git branch (git@github.com:mifi/editly.git#master) via npm at package() time, bypassing all AUR source integrity mechanisms (no source array, no checksums, no pkgver pinning). This means: (1) the installed content is whatever is on the master branch at build time — no reproducibility, no integrity verification; (2) npm will also pull in all transitive dependencies from the npm registry at build time without any pinning or checksum verification; (3) using SSH URL (git@github.com) rather than HTTPS is unusual and could fail in many environments, but more importantly it fetches and executes arbitrary remote code. While the upstream repository (mifi/editly) is a legitimate open-source project, the packaging pattern completely bypasses Arch's source integrity model and installs unverified, unpinned, live code. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a compromise of the upstream repo or any of its npm dependencies would be silently installed. Rated medium rather than high because the upstream is a real, known project and there is no evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

Medium npm/yarn/pnpm install of an undeclared external package npm_install_external

Runs `npm/yarn/pnpm install <package>` for a package not in source=(), pulling unpinned, unreviewed code at build time. Severity downgraded: the package declares/looks like a Node.js consumer, where build-time installs are expected.

PKGBUILD:19 npm install --user root -g --prefix="${pkgdir}"/usr git@github.com:mifi/editly.git#master

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): The PKGBUILD installs directly from a live Git branch (git@github.com:mifi/editly.git#master) via npm at package() time, bypassing all AUR source integrity mechanisms (no source array, no checksums, no pkgver pinning). This means: (1) the installed content is whatever is on the master branch at build time — no reproducibility, no integrity verification; (2) npm will also pull in all transitive dependencies from the npm registry at build time without any pinning or checksum verification; (3) using SSH URL (git@github.com) rather than HTTPS is unusual and could fail in many environments, but more importantly it fetches and executes arbitrary remote code. While the upstream repository (mifi/editly) is a legitimate open-source project, the packaging pattern completely bypasses Arch's source integrity model and installs unverified, unpinned, live code. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: a compromise of the upstream repo or any of its npm dependencies would be silently installed. Rated medium rather than high because the upstream is a real, known project and there is no evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: soloturn@gmail.com
    
      2
    
      3_npmname=editly
    
      4_basename=nodejs-$_npmname
    
      5pkgname="$_basename-git"
    
      6pkgver=0.11.1_git
    
      7pkgrel=0
    
      8pkgdesc='create video from a set of clips, images and titles, NLE, non-linear video editing'
    
      9arch=('any')
    
      10url='https://github.com/mifi/editly'
    
      11license=('MIT')
    
      12depends=('ffmpeg' 'nodejs')
    
      13makedepends=('npm')
    
      14options=(!emptydirs)
    
      15conflicts=("$_basename")
    
      16provides=("$_basename")
    
      17
    
      18package() {
    
      19  npm install --user root -g --prefix="${pkgdir}"/usr git@github.com:mifi/editly.git#master
    
      20
    
      21  install -d -m755 "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      22  ln -s "../../../lib/node_modules/${_npmname}/LICENSE" \
    
      23     "${pkgdir}/usr/share/licenses/${pkgname}"
    
      24
    
      25  # Clean up
    
      26  find "${pkgdir}" -name "package.json" -exec sed -e "s|${pkgdir}||g" -e "s|${srcdir}||g" -i {} \; \
    
      27       -or -name ".*" -type f -exec rm '{}' \; \
    
      28       -or -name ".*" -type d -prune -exec rm -r '{}' \; \
    
      29       -or -name "benchmark" -type d -prune -exec rm -r '{}' \; \
    
      30       -or -name "man" -type d -prune -exec rm -r '{}' \; \
    
      31       -or -name "test" -type d -prune -exec rm -r '{}' \; \
    
      32       -or -name "tests" -type d -prune -exec rm -r '{}' \; \
    
      33       -or ! -type l -perm /022 -exec chmod g-w,o-w '{}' \;
    
      34}
    
      35
    
      36# vim:set ts=2 sw=2 et:
    
      37
    
      38

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2