noip

maintainer runnytu · 54 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a tarball from a CloudFront CDN URL (dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net) rather than directly from no-ip.com's official download servers. While no-ip.com does use CloudFront as their CDN, this specific distribution URL is not directly verifiable as the canonical official source. More importantly, the package extracts a prebuilt Debian binary package (.deb) and installs its binaries directly — this is an executed binary from a non-standard/CDN host rather than compiled from source. The sha512sums provide integrity checking, but they only protect against accidental corruption or a one-time swap, not against a compromised upstream host that consistently serves the same malicious binary. The binary is a DDNS client daemon that runs as a systemd service with network access, making the impact of any compromise significant. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host, installed and run as a system service, even though the CloudFront URL is plausibly the vendor's own CDN.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 source=('https://dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net/downloads/noip-duc_3.3.0.tar.gz'
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a tarball from a CloudFront CDN URL (dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net) rather than directly from no-ip.com's official download servers. While no-ip.com does use CloudFront as their CDN, this specific distribution URL is not directly verifiable as the canonical official source. More importantly, the package extracts a prebuilt Debian binary package (.deb) and installs its binaries directly — this is an executed binary from a non-standard/CDN host rather than compiled from source. The sha512sums provide integrity checking, but they only protect against accidental corruption or a one-time swap, not against a compromised upstream host that consistently serves the same malicious binary. The binary is a DDNS client daemon that runs as a systemd service with network access, making the impact of any compromise significant. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host, installed and run as a system service, even though the CloudFront URL is plausibly the vendor's own CDN.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Runnytu < runnytu at gmail dot com >
2# Contributor: Alexander Rødseth <rodseth@gmail.com>
3# Contributor: Daenyth
4# Contributor: Lyle Putnam <lcputnam@amerytel.net>
5
6pkgname=noip
7pkgver=3.3.0
8pkgrel=1
9pkgdesc='Dynamic DNS Client Updater for no-ip.com services'
10arch=('x86_64' 'i686' 'armv7h' 'armv6h' 'aarch64')
11url='http://www.no-ip.com/downloads.php?page=linux'
12license=('GPL')
13install="$pkgname.install"
14depends=('glibc')
15source=('https://dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net/downloads/noip-duc_3.3.0.tar.gz'
16 'noip.service')
17sha512sums=('5d9ef7a6bc355d55b23b52ac6b9cd7c8b95a0c8196108a3c8384fe34cc588a7e7f9b40ccf7649b2500c251707feb42fb2646a6fc2deee60d7c34fcb40734e3a8'
18 '6949972af4a0b71c0f1e57230a78757b47799bbc50050ebf74893603ace6a0e959dbb4cb4523bb992d579f1369ee1e008c67f270cd6d670ad88d176485704856')
19
20package() {
21 tar xf noip-duc_3.3.0.tar.gz
22 cd "$pkgname-duc_$pkgver/binaries"
23 ar xf noip-duc_3.3.0_amd64.deb
24 tar xf data.tar.xz
25 mv usr "${pkgdir}"
26 rm -fr noip-duc_3.3.0
27
28 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/"
29 install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.service" \
30 "$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/noip.service"
31}
32
33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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