noip
The PKGBUILD downloads a tarball from a CloudFront CDN URL (dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net) rather than directly from no-ip.com's official download servers. While no-ip.com does use CloudFront as their CDN, this specific distribution URL is not directly verifiable as the canonical official source. More importantly, the package extracts a prebuilt Debian binary package (.deb) and installs its binaries directly — this is an executed binary from a non-standard/CDN host rather than compiled from source. The sha512sums provide integrity checking, but they only protect against accidental corruption or a one-time swap, not against a compromised upstream host that consistently serves the same malicious binary. The binary is a DDNS client daemon that runs as a systemd service with network access, making the impact of any compromise significant. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host, installed and run as a system service, even though the CloudFront URL is plausibly the vendor's own CDN.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:15
source=('https://dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net/downloads/noip-duc_3.3.0.tar.gz'
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a tarball from a CloudFront CDN URL (dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net) rather than directly from no-ip.com's official download servers. While no-ip.com does use CloudFront as their CDN, this specific distribution URL is not directly verifiable as the canonical official source. More importantly, the package extracts a prebuilt Debian binary package (.deb) and installs its binaries directly — this is an executed binary from a non-standard/CDN host rather than compiled from source. The sha512sums provide integrity checking, but they only protect against accidental corruption or a one-time swap, not against a compromised upstream host that consistently serves the same malicious binary. The binary is a DDNS client daemon that runs as a systemd service with network access, making the impact of any compromise significant. This is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern: prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host, installed and run as a system service, even though the CloudFront URL is plausibly the vendor's own CDN.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: Runnytu < runnytu at gmail dot com >
# Contributor: Alexander Rødseth <rodseth@gmail.com>
# Contributor: Daenyth
# Contributor: Lyle Putnam <lcputnam@amerytel.net>
pkgname=noip
pkgver=3.3.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc='Dynamic DNS Client Updater for no-ip.com services'
arch=('x86_64' 'i686' 'armv7h' 'armv6h' 'aarch64')
url='http://www.no-ip.com/downloads.php?page=linux'
license=('GPL')
install="$pkgname.install"
depends=('glibc')
source=('https://dmej8g5cpdyqd.cloudfront.net/downloads/noip-duc_3.3.0.tar.gz'
'noip.service')
sha512sums=('5d9ef7a6bc355d55b23b52ac6b9cd7c8b95a0c8196108a3c8384fe34cc588a7e7f9b40ccf7649b2500c251707feb42fb2646a6fc2deee60d7c34fcb40734e3a8'
'6949972af4a0b71c0f1e57230a78757b47799bbc50050ebf74893603ace6a0e959dbb4cb4523bb992d579f1369ee1e008c67f270cd6d670ad88d176485704856')
package() {
tar xf noip-duc_3.3.0.tar.gz
cd "$pkgname-duc_$pkgver/binaries"
ar xf noip-duc_3.3.0_amd64.deb
tar xf data.tar.xz
mv usr "${pkgdir}"
rm -fr noip-duc_3.3.0
install -d "$pkgdir/usr/"
install -Dm644 "$srcdir/$pkgname.service" \
"$pkgdir/usr/lib/systemd/system/noip.service"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |