notedeck-bin

maintainer modinfo · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from damus.io (the official project website, matching the upstream URL on GitHub at github.com/damus-io/notedeck) and installs the extracted binaries directly. While damus.io is the official vendor host for this project, the use of 'SKIP' for checksums means there is no integrity verification — any compromise or substitution of the binary at the source URL would go undetected. This is a real supply-chain concern: executed binaries with no checksum verification. The host is the official vendor (not a random personal host), which reduces but does not eliminate the risk. This warrants a medium rating rather than high, as there is no evidence of malice, but the missing checksums on executed binaries represent a genuine packaging security gap.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:12 source_x86_64=("https://damus.io/notedeck/dl/v${pkgver}/notedeck_v${pkgver}-x64.deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt binary .deb packages from damus.io (the official project website, matching the upstream URL on GitHub at github.com/damus-io/notedeck) and installs the extracted binaries directly. While damus.io is the official vendor host for this project, the use of 'SKIP' for checksums means there is no integrity verification — any compromise or substitution of the binary at the source URL would go undetected. This is a real supply-chain concern: executed binaries with no checksum verification. The host is the official vendor (not a random personal host), which reduces but does not eliminate the risk. This warrants a medium rating rather than high, as there is no evidence of malice, but the missing checksums on executed binaries represent a genuine packaging security gap.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Sebastian Korotkiewicz <skorotkiewicz@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=notedeck-bin
4pkgver=0.4.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="The nostr browser"
7arch=('x86_64' 'aarch64')
8url="https://github.com/damus-io/notedeck" # https://damus.io/notedeck/install/
9license=('GPL-3')
10depends=('glibc')
11options=(!strip)
12source_x86_64=("https://damus.io/notedeck/dl/v${pkgver}/notedeck_v${pkgver}-x64.deb")
13source_aarch64=("https://damus.io/notedeck/dl/v${pkgver}/notedeck_v${pkgver}-arm64.deb")
14sha256sums_x86_64=('SKIP')
15sha256sums_aarch64=('SKIP')
16
17package() {
18 # Create package directory if it doesn't exist
19 mkdir -p "$pkgdir"
20
21 # Extract the .deb archive
22 cd "$srcdir"
23 # ar x "../notedeck_v${pkgver}-x64.deb"
24 ar x "${srcdir}/notedeck_v${pkgver}-"*".deb"
25
26 # Extract data archive to the package directory
27 tar -xf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir"
28
29 # Clean up
30 rm -f control.tar.xz data.tar.xz debian-binary
31
32 # Create a menu entry if desktop files exist but weren't included
33 if [ -f "$pkgdir/usr/bin/notedeck" ] && [ ! -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications" ]; then
34 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications"
35 cat > "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/notedeck.desktop" << EOF
36[Desktop Entry]
37Name=Notedeck
38GenericName=The nostr browser
39Exec=notedeck
40Terminal=false
41Type=Application
42Categories=Utility;
43EOF
44 fi
45}
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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