notrisfoes-desktop

maintainer TSTdoll · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287

MEDIUM

Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary from notrisfoes.com (the project's own domain, matching the url= field), extracts it, and installs the contents directly. The checksums (sha512 and b2) are pinned, which mitigates casual substitution attacks. However, notrisfoes.com is a small, unverifiable personal/indie project host — not an established vendor mirror or language-ecosystem registry. The binary is executed on the user's system (Electron/GTK3 desktop app based on depends), and there is no source build, no reproducibility, and no way to audit what the binary actually does. This is a classic 'prebuilt binary from an unofficial host' pattern: not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern if the host is ever compromised or the maintainer is not who they claim to be. The pinned checksums reduce but do not eliminate the risk (they only protect against in-transit tampering, not a malicious original upload). Severity remains medium.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:10 source_x86_64=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.${CARCH}.rpm::https://notrisfoes.com/download/notris-foes-0.2.0.rpm")

MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt RPM binary from notrisfoes.com (the project's own domain, matching the url= field), extracts it, and installs the contents directly. The checksums (sha512 and b2) are pinned, which mitigates casual substitution attacks. However, notrisfoes.com is a small, unverifiable personal/indie project host — not an established vendor mirror or language-ecosystem registry. The binary is executed on the user's system (Electron/GTK3 desktop app based on depends), and there is no source build, no reproducibility, and no way to audit what the binary actually does. This is a classic 'prebuilt binary from an unofficial host' pattern: not clearly malicious, but a genuine supply-chain concern if the host is ever compromised or the maintainer is not who they claim to be. The pinned checksums reduce but do not eliminate the risk (they only protect against in-transit tampering, not a malicious original upload). Severity remains medium.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: TSTman <tstman@protonmail.com>
    
      2pkgname=notrisfoes-desktop
    
      3pkgver=0.2.0
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc='Notris Foes desktop client'
    
      6url=https://notrisfoes.com/
    
      7arch=('x86_64')
    
      8license=()
    
      9depends=(gtk3 libxss nss)
    
      10source_x86_64=("${pkgname}-${pkgver}.${CARCH}.rpm::https://notrisfoes.com/download/notris-foes-0.2.0.rpm")
    
      11sha512sums_x86_64=(ddabb9c9d02bd723771e89de739d687b855fb0f745de14875962b7255b515adf52fac42122c311bb640abb5f81eed19c58a040872cf7b70f6de9abbb7ee3d778)
    
      12b2sums_x86_64=(eb9f0a70e75c6c850480c0ac2e816721124bb7eeffd0f0609ea8b62a0daa0677bd28b42a3b239a613bfec6012f682565709c11b5145578470670fab3c1ad369a)
    
      13
    
      14package() {
    
      15  cp -a "${srcdir}/usr" "$pkgdir"
    
      16}
    
      17
    
      18# vim: ts=2 sw=2 et:
    
      19

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-08-03 00:08:14	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-02 00:16:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-08-01 00:11:18	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-31 00:14:10	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-30 00:17:23	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-29 00:25:53	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-28 00:07:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-27 00:24:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-26 00:07:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-25 00:13:44	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-24 00:02:28	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-23 00:14:47	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-22 00:29:32	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-21 00:24:15	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-20 00:19:49	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-19 00:17:08	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-18 00:14:48	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-17 00:06:16	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-16 00:05:41	MEDIUM	2
2026-07-15 00:09:25	MEDIUM	2