oh-my-dde-bin

MEDIUM
maintainer orphaned 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from Gitee (a personal/project repository attachment URL), extracts it, and installs the binary directly. The binary is a compiled executable (oh-my-dde) installed to /usr/bin via symlink from /opt/apps. While Gitee is a legitimate code hosting platform (Chinese GitHub equivalent), the source is a personal project's attached binary artifact rather than a reproducible build from source. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not verify the trustworthiness of the binary itself. The attach_files URL pattern on Gitee is a standard file attachment mechanism, not inherently suspicious. However, installing an unauditable prebuilt binary from a personal project host (not an official vendor release) is a genuine supply-chain concern: the binary could contain arbitrary code, and there is no way to verify it matches the published source without building from source. This fits the medium severity definition: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://gitee.com/Limexb/oh-my-dde/attach_files/845257/download/top.yzzi.youjian_1.0.3_amd64.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from Gitee (a personal/project repository attachment URL), extracts it, and installs the binary directly. The binary is a compiled executable (oh-my-dde) installed to /usr/bin via symlink from /opt/apps. While Gitee is a legitimate code hosting platform (Chinese GitHub equivalent), the source is a personal project's attached binary artifact rather than a reproducible build from source. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not verify the trustworthiness of the binary itself. The attach_files URL pattern on Gitee is a standard file attachment mechanism, not inherently suspicious. However, installing an unauditable prebuilt binary from a personal project host (not an official vendor release) is a genuine supply-chain concern: the binary could contain arbitrary code, and there is no way to verify it matches the published source without building from source. This fits the medium severity definition: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1pkgname="oh-my-dde-bin"
2pkgver="1.0.3"
3pkgrel=1
4pkgdesc="A customization tool for deepin desktop environmen."
5arch=('any')
6url="https://gitee.com/Limexb/oh-my-dde"
7license=('unknown')
8provides=("oh-my-dde")
9depends=('xautomation' 'xclip' 'gsettings-desktop-schemas' 'dtkwidget')
10makedepends=('bzip2')
11source=("https://gitee.com/Limexb/oh-my-dde/attach_files/845257/download/top.yzzi.youjian_1.0.3_amd64.deb")
12sha256sums=('5746784feb5bfd281119940a69b6e8a13a0157301d529b38af40a0a67fb1fcb2')
13build() {
14 mkdir -p "${srcdir}/output"
15 tar -xvf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" -C "${srcdir}/output"
16}
17package() {
18 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
19 install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/"
20 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
21 install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/"
22
23 cp -r "${srcdir}/output/opt/apps" "${pkgdir}/opt/"
24 ln -s /opt/apps/top.yzzi.youjian/files/oh-my-dde "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/oh-my-dde"
25 ln -s /opt/apps/top.yzzi.youjian/entries/applications/top.yzzi.youjian.desktop "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/top.yzzi.youjian.desktop"
26 ln -s /opt/apps/top.yzzi.youjian/entries/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/youjian.svg "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/"
27}
28

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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