oh-my-dde-bin
This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from Gitee (a personal/project repository attachment URL), extracts it, and installs the binary directly. The binary is a compiled executable (oh-my-dde) installed to /usr/bin via symlink from /opt/apps. While Gitee is a legitimate code hosting platform (Chinese GitHub equivalent), the source is a personal project's attached binary artifact rather than a reproducible build from source. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not verify the trustworthiness of the binary itself. The attach_files URL pattern on Gitee is a standard file attachment mechanism, not inherently suspicious. However, installing an unauditable prebuilt binary from a personal project host (not an official vendor release) is a genuine supply-chain concern: the binary could contain arbitrary code, and there is no way to verify it matches the published source without building from source. This fits the medium severity definition: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:11
source=("https://gitee.com/Limexb/oh-my-dde/attach_files/845257/download/top.yzzi.youjian_1.0.3_amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 78%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb package from Gitee (a personal/project repository attachment URL), extracts it, and installs the binary directly. The binary is a compiled executable (oh-my-dde) installed to /usr/bin via symlink from /opt/apps. While Gitee is a legitimate code hosting platform (Chinese GitHub equivalent), the source is a personal project's attached binary artifact rather than a reproducible build from source. The sha256sum provides integrity checking against tampering in transit, but does not verify the trustworthiness of the binary itself. The attach_files URL pattern on Gitee is a standard file attachment mechanism, not inherently suspicious. However, installing an unauditable prebuilt binary from a personal project host (not an official vendor release) is a genuine supply-chain concern: the binary could contain arbitrary code, and there is no way to verify it matches the published source without building from source. This fits the medium severity definition: an executed binary from an unofficial/personal host.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlightedpkgname="oh-my-dde-bin"
pkgver="1.0.3"
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="A customization tool for deepin desktop environmen."
arch=('any')
url="https://gitee.com/Limexb/oh-my-dde"
license=('unknown')
provides=("oh-my-dde")
depends=('xautomation' 'xclip' 'gsettings-desktop-schemas' 'dtkwidget')
makedepends=('bzip2')
source=("https://gitee.com/Limexb/oh-my-dde/attach_files/845257/download/top.yzzi.youjian_1.0.3_amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('5746784feb5bfd281119940a69b6e8a13a0157301d529b38af40a0a67fb1fcb2')
build() {
mkdir -p "${srcdir}/output"
tar -xvf "${srcdir}/data.tar.xz" -C "${srcdir}/output"
}
package() {
install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/"
install -d "${pkgdir}/opt/apps/"
install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/"
install -d "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/"
cp -r "${srcdir}/output/opt/apps" "${pkgdir}/opt/"
ln -s /opt/apps/top.yzzi.youjian/files/oh-my-dde "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/oh-my-dde"
ln -s /opt/apps/top.yzzi.youjian/entries/applications/top.yzzi.youjian.desktop "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/top.yzzi.youjian.desktop"
ln -s /opt/apps/top.yzzi.youjian/entries/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/youjian.svg "${pkgdir}/usr/share/icons/hicolor/scalable/apps/"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |