omni-terminal

MEDIUM
maintainer importcjj 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658
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Why flagged

This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wisburg.com (a vendor-specific but non-standard host) with sha256sums=('SKIP'), meaning no integrity verification is performed. The package extracts and installs the binary directly into pkgdir. The concerns are: (1) no checksum verification allows silent substitution of the binary at any time; (2) the source URL uses a UUID-style path rather than a versioned release path, making it harder to audit; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly without source compilation. While wisburg.com appears to be a legitimate commercial product (omni terminal), the combination of an unverified prebuilt binary from a non-standard host constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("https://download.wisburg.com/omni/prod/6fd15f71-f995-4a9a-9103-c84e8c1a1b68.deb")
Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.wisburg.com (a vendor-specific but non-standard host) with sha256sums=('SKIP'), meaning no integrity verification is performed. The package extracts and installs the binary directly into pkgdir. The concerns are: (1) no checksum verification allows silent substitution of the binary at any time; (2) the source URL uses a UUID-style path rather than a versioned release path, making it harder to audit; (3) the binary is executed/installed directly without source compilation. While wisburg.com appears to be a legitimate commercial product (omni terminal), the combination of an unverified prebuilt binary from a non-standard host constitutes a genuine supply-chain risk. This is a real medium-severity concern, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: importcjj <importcjj at gmail dot com>
2
3pkgname=omni-terminal
4pkgver=0.5.2
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="The omni terminal, produced by wisburg."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://wisburg.com/"
9license=('custom')
10makedepends=('wget' 'dpkg') # dpkg 用于解压.deb文件
11source=("https://download.wisburg.com/omni/prod/6fd15f71-f995-4a9a-9103-c84e8c1a1b68.deb")
12sha256sums=('SKIP')
13
14package() {
15 tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "$pkgdir"
16}
17

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-09-17 00:27:14 Medium 2
2026-09-16 00:03:17 Medium 2
2026-09-15 00:25:31 Medium 2
2026-09-14 00:27:57 Medium 2
2026-09-13 00:19:54 Medium 2
2026-09-12 00:25:17 Medium 2
2026-09-11 00:19:22 Medium 2
2026-09-10 00:22:44 Medium 2
2026-09-09 00:04:09 Medium 2
2026-09-08 00:18:08 Medium 2
2026-09-07 00:30:15 Medium 2
2026-09-06 00:17:06 Medium 2
2026-09-05 00:16:27 Medium 2
2026-09-04 00:03:13 Medium 2
2026-09-03 00:15:47 Medium 2
2026-09-02 00:02:31 Medium 2
2026-09-01 00:11:19 Medium 2
2026-08-31 00:19:57 Medium 2
2026-08-30 00:04:14 Medium 2
2026-08-29 00:29:17 Medium 2

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