onekey-bridge
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from web.onekey-asset.com, which is OneKey's own CDN/asset host (OneKey is a legitimate hardware wallet vendor, fork of Trezor). The domain is not a random personal host but an official vendor asset domain. A SHA-256 checksum is present and pinned. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary daemon (onekeyd) that runs as a systemd service with udev rules — this is executed privileged code from a binary blob, not built from source. Even with a checksum, if the vendor's asset CDN were compromised or the binary were swapped before the checksum was recorded, there is a real supply-chain risk. The pattern (prebuilt binary daemon installed as a system service) from a CDN subdomain rather than a GitHub release or official package repository warrants medium severity. This is not clearly malicious, but it is a legitimate supply-chain concern for an executed binary with elevated system integration.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:9
source=("https://web.onekey-asset.com/bridge/v2.2.0/onekey-bridge-2.2.0-amd64.deb")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from web.onekey-asset.com, which is OneKey's own CDN/asset host (OneKey is a legitimate hardware wallet vendor, fork of Trezor). The domain is not a random personal host but an official vendor asset domain. A SHA-256 checksum is present and pinned. However, the package installs a prebuilt binary daemon (onekeyd) that runs as a systemd service with udev rules — this is executed privileged code from a binary blob, not built from source. Even with a checksum, if the vendor's asset CDN were compromised or the binary were swapped before the checksum was recorded, there is a real supply-chain risk. The pattern (prebuilt binary daemon installed as a system service) from a CDN subdomain rather than a GitHub release or official package repository warrants medium severity. This is not clearly malicious, but it is a legitimate supply-chain concern for an executed binary with elevated system integration.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlightedpkgname=onekey-bridge
pkgver=2.2.0
pkgrel=1
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://onekey.so/download/?client=bridge"
license=('custom')
# depends=('')
makedepends=('dpkg')
source=("https://web.onekey-asset.com/bridge/v2.2.0/onekey-bridge-2.2.0-amd64.deb")
sha256sums=('75b21054d95f7c527b833913a5b227c02305b8b29ea20a1a716717e8b98c132c')
pkgdesc="OneKey Bridge. Might be required to connect your hardware wallet"
prepare() {
dpkg -x onekey-bridge-2.2.0-amd64.deb .
tar -xvf data.tar.xz -C "$srcdir"
}
package() {
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/lib/udev/rules.d/50-onekey.rules" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/udev/rules.d/50-onekey.rules"
install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/usr/bin/onekeyd" "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/onekeyd"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/onekeyd.service" "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/systemd/system/onekeyd.service"
install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/usr/share/doc/onekey-bridge/changelog.gz" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/onekey-bridge/changelog.gz"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |