open-interpreter-desktop-bin

maintainer ofluffydev · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from openinterpreter.com with sha256sums=('SKIP'), meaning no integrity verification is performed. The binary is then installed and executed directly. While openinterpreter.com is the official upstream vendor site, the combination of a moving 'latest' URL (no versioned/pinned download) and a skipped checksum means there is no way to verify what binary is actually being installed at any given time. If the upstream host is compromised or the URL is redirected, an arbitrary executable would be installed and run on the user's system. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unverifiable source with no checksum. The official-looking domain reduces but does not eliminate the risk — the lack of any integrity check is the core issue. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain risk.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:20 source=("Interpreter.AppImage::https://openinterpreter.com/download/linux/appimage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 85%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from openinterpreter.com with sha256sums=('SKIP'), meaning no integrity verification is performed. The binary is then installed and executed directly. While openinterpreter.com is the official upstream vendor site, the combination of a moving 'latest' URL (no versioned/pinned download) and a skipped checksum means there is no way to verify what binary is actually being installed at any given time. If the upstream host is compromised or the URL is redirected, an arbitrary executable would be installed and run on the user's system. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: an executed binary from an unverifiable source with no checksum. The official-looking domain reduces but does not eliminate the risk — the lack of any integrity check is the core issue. This is a textbook medium-severity supply-chain risk.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Kaden Frisk <fufferpish@gmail.com>
2#
3# NOTE: Upstream only provides a moving "latest" AppImage URL and no stable versioned downloads.
4# This package therefore tracks "latest" and may require rebuilds to pull updates.
5# To update: rebuild the package (e.g. makepkg -Csf).
6
7pkgname=open-interpreter-desktop-bin
8pkgver=latest
9pkgrel=1
10pkgdesc="Open Interpreter Desktop Agent (AppImage, upstream is 'latest' only)"
11arch=('x86_64')
12url="https://openinterpreter.com/"
13license=('custom')
14depends=('fuse2')
15provides=('interpreter-desktop')
16conflicts=('interpreter-desktop')
17options=(!strip !debug)
18
19# Moving target ("latest") — checksum cannot be pinned reliably.
20source=("Interpreter.AppImage::https://openinterpreter.com/download/linux/appimage")
21sha256sums=('SKIP')
22
23install="${pkgname}.install"
24
25package() {
26 # AppImage
27 install -Dm755 "${srcdir}/Interpreter.AppImage" \
28 "${pkgdir}/opt/interpreter-desktop/Interpreter.AppImage"
29
30 # Convenience wrapper
31 install -Dm755 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/interpreter-desktop" <<'EOF'
32#!/bin/sh
33exec /opt/interpreter-desktop/Interpreter.AppImage "$@"
34EOF
35
36 # Desktop entry (no custom icon installed)
37 install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/interpreter-desktop.desktop" <<'EOF'
38[Desktop Entry]
39Type=Application
40Name=Interpreter: The Desktop Agent
41Comment=Open Interpreter Desktop Agent
42Exec=/opt/interpreter-desktop/Interpreter.AppImage
43Terminal=false
44Categories=Development;Utility;
45Icon=utilities-terminal
46StartupNotify=true
47EOF
48}

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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