openhab3-snapshot-addons

maintainer orphaned · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .kar (OSGi bundle archive, essentially a ZIP of JARs containing executable Java bytecode) from ci.openhab.org, which is the official OpenHAB CI server. While ci.openhab.org is the legitimate upstream CI infrastructure, the combination of: (1) pinning to 'lastSuccessfulBuild' rather than a fixed build number or release artifact, meaning the artifact can change at any time without the PKGBUILD changing, and (2) sha256sums=('SKIP') with no integrity verification, means there is no way to detect substitution or tampering. The .kar file is installed into the addons directory where it will be loaded and executed by the OpenHAB runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if ci.openhab.org is compromised or the build artifact is swapped, users would silently receive and execute malicious Java code. The host is official/legitimate, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk compared to a personal host. The SKIP checksum on an executed artifact from a mutable CI URL is the core issue.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:14 source=("openhab-addons-${pkgver}-SNAPSHOT.kar::https://ci.openhab.org/job/openHAB3-Distribution/lastSuccessfulBuild/artifact/distributions/openhab-addons/target/openhab-addons-${pkgver}-SNAPSHOT.kar")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt .kar (OSGi bundle archive, essentially a ZIP of JARs containing executable Java bytecode) from ci.openhab.org, which is the official OpenHAB CI server. While ci.openhab.org is the legitimate upstream CI infrastructure, the combination of: (1) pinning to 'lastSuccessfulBuild' rather than a fixed build number or release artifact, meaning the artifact can change at any time without the PKGBUILD changing, and (2) sha256sums=('SKIP') with no integrity verification, means there is no way to detect substitution or tampering. The .kar file is installed into the addons directory where it will be loaded and executed by the OpenHAB runtime. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: if ci.openhab.org is compromised or the build artifact is swapped, users would silently receive and execute malicious Java code. The host is official/legitimate, which reduces but does not eliminate the risk compared to a personal host. The SKIP checksum on an executed artifact from a mutable CI URL is the core issue.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Christoph Scholz <christoph.scholz@gmail.com>
2_pkgbase=openhab3
3pkgname=${_pkgbase}-snapshot-addons
4pkgver=3.4.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="addons for openhab3 open source home automation software"
7arch=("any")
8url="http://www.openhab.org/"
9license=("EPL")
10depends=("openhab3-snapshot")
11
12conflicts=("openhab3-addons")
13
14source=("openhab-addons-${pkgver}-SNAPSHOT.kar::https://ci.openhab.org/job/openHAB3-Distribution/lastSuccessfulBuild/artifact/distributions/openhab-addons/target/openhab-addons-${pkgver}-SNAPSHOT.kar")
15
16sha256sums=('SKIP')
17
18package() {
19 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${_pkgbase}/addons"
20 cp "${srcdir}/openhab-addons-${pkgver}-SNAPSHOT.kar" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${_pkgbase}/addons"
21 echo "z "/usr/share/${_pkgbase}/addons/openhab-addons-${pkgver}-SNAPSHOT.kar" - ${_pkgbase} ${_pkgbase} -" | install -Dm644 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/${pkgname}.conf"
22}
23

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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