origami-waves

maintainer hellonico · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged A prebuilt JAR is downloaded from repository.hellonico.info, which is a personal/project-specific Maven repository operated by the same author (hellonico) as the GitHub project (github.com/hellonico/ocean-waves). While the host appears to be the author's own Maven repository rather than a completely unrelated third party, it is still not an official, audited distribution channel (e.g., Maven Central, GitHub Releases). The JAR is executed directly via 'java -jar', meaning any malicious or compromised content would result in code execution. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the hash only protects against post-download tampering if the source itself was clean at time of hash generation. The core concern is that a personal Maven repository host could be compromised, taken over, or the JAR could have been built from unreviewed sources. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no reproducible build path provided to users.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/hellonico/origami/wave/${pkgver}/wave-${pkgver}.jar")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): A prebuilt JAR is downloaded from repository.hellonico.info, which is a personal/project-specific Maven repository operated by the same author (hellonico) as the GitHub project (github.com/hellonico/ocean-waves). While the host appears to be the author's own Maven repository rather than a completely unrelated third party, it is still not an official, audited distribution channel (e.g., Maven Central, GitHub Releases). The JAR is executed directly via 'java -jar', meaning any malicious or compromised content would result in code execution. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the hash only protects against post-download tampering if the source itself was clean at time of hash generation. The core concern is that a personal Maven repository host could be compromised, taken over, or the JAR could have been built from unreviewed sources. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no reproducible build path provided to users.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Your Name <your.email@example.com>
2pkgname=origami-waves
3pkgver=1.19
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Origami Waves: translate your pptx using ollama"
6#arch=('x86_64')
7arch=('any')
8url="https://github.com/hellonico/ocean-waves"
9license=('MIT')
10depends=('jdk-openjdk>=21')
11#makedepends=('clojure' 'deps-edn')
12#source=("https://github.com/yourusername/my-clojure-project/releases/download/v${pkgver}/my-clojure-project-${pkgver}.jar")
13source=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/hellonico/origami/wave/${pkgver}/wave-${pkgver}.jar")
14sha256sums=('2d560220d599888594647c5a8cc49499a596e6be6612fde89bdef72e880606da')
15
16build() {
17 echo "No additional build step required. Uberjar provided."
18}
19
20package() {
21 # Install the jar
22 install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/wave-${pkgver}.jar" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jar"
23
24 # Create a script to run the jar
25 install -Dm755 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}" << EOF
26#!/bin/bash
27exec java -jar /usr/share/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jar "\$@"
28EOF
29
30 # Optional: Install documentation
31 # install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/README.md" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md"
32}
33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
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2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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