origami-waves

MEDIUM

maintainer hellonico 0 votes scanned 2026-09-17 00:27:14.276658

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Why flagged

A prebuilt JAR is downloaded from repository.hellonico.info, which is a personal/project-specific Maven repository operated by the same author (hellonico) as the GitHub project (github.com/hellonico/ocean-waves). While the host appears to be the author's own Maven repository rather than a completely unrelated third party, it is still not an official, audited distribution channel (e.g., Maven Central, GitHub Releases). The JAR is executed directly via 'java -jar', meaning any malicious or compromised content would result in code execution. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the hash only protects against post-download tampering if the source itself was clean at time of hash generation. The core concern is that a personal Maven repository host could be compromised, taken over, or the JAR could have been built from unreviewed sources. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no reproducible build path provided to users.

Triggered rules

Medium source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

PKGBUILD:13 source=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/hellonico/origami/wave/${pkgver}/wave-${pkgver}.jar")

Medium AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): A prebuilt JAR is downloaded from repository.hellonico.info, which is a personal/project-specific Maven repository operated by the same author (hellonico) as the GitHub project (github.com/hellonico/ocean-waves). While the host appears to be the author's own Maven repository rather than a completely unrelated third party, it is still not an official, audited distribution channel (e.g., Maven Central, GitHub Releases). The JAR is executed directly via 'java -jar', meaning any malicious or compromised content would result in code execution. A sha256sum is provided, which mitigates substitution risk somewhat, but the hash only protects against post-download tampering if the source itself was clean at time of hash generation. The core concern is that a personal Maven repository host could be compromised, taken over, or the JAR could have been built from unreviewed sources. This is a genuine, if moderate, supply-chain concern: executed binary from a non-standard personal host with no reproducible build path provided to users.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted

      1# Maintainer: Your Name <your.email@example.com>
    
      2pkgname=origami-waves
    
      3pkgver=1.19
    
      4pkgrel=1
    
      5pkgdesc="Origami Waves: translate your pptx using ollama"
    
      6#arch=('x86_64')
    
      7arch=('any')
    
      8url="https://github.com/hellonico/ocean-waves"
    
      9license=('MIT')
    
      10depends=('jdk-openjdk>=21')
    
      11#makedepends=('clojure' 'deps-edn')
    
      12#source=("https://github.com/yourusername/my-clojure-project/releases/download/v${pkgver}/my-clojure-project-${pkgver}.jar")
    
      13source=("https://repository.hellonico.info/repository/hellonico/origami/wave/${pkgver}/wave-${pkgver}.jar")
    
      14sha256sums=('2d560220d599888594647c5a8cc49499a596e6be6612fde89bdef72e880606da')
    
      15
    
      16build() {
    
      17  echo "No additional build step required. Uberjar provided."
    
      18}
    
      19
    
      20package() {
    
      21  # Install the jar
    
      22  install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/wave-${pkgver}.jar" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jar"
    
      23
    
      24  # Create a script to run the jar
    
      25  install -Dm755 /dev/stdin "${pkgdir}/usr/bin/${pkgname}" << EOF
    
      26#!/bin/bash
    
      27exec java -jar /usr/share/${pkgname}/${pkgname}.jar "\$@"
    
      28EOF
    
      29
    
      30  # Optional: Install documentation
    
      31  # install -Dm644 "${srcdir}/README.md" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/doc/${pkgname}/README.md"
    
      32}
    
      33

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)	Severity	Rules
2026-09-17 00:27:14	Medium	2
2026-09-16 00:03:17	Medium	2
2026-09-15 00:25:31	Medium	2
2026-09-14 00:27:57	Medium	2
2026-09-13 00:19:54	Medium	2
2026-09-12 00:25:17	Medium	2
2026-09-11 00:19:22	Medium	2
2026-09-10 00:22:44	Medium	2
2026-09-09 00:04:09	Medium	2
2026-09-08 00:18:08	Medium	2
2026-09-07 00:30:15	Medium	2
2026-09-06 00:17:06	Medium	2
2026-09-05 00:16:27	Medium	2
2026-09-04 00:03:13	Medium	2
2026-09-03 00:15:47	Medium	2
2026-09-02 00:02:31	Medium	2
2026-09-01 00:11:19	Medium	2
2026-08-31 00:19:57	Medium	2
2026-08-30 00:04:14	Medium	2
2026-08-29 00:29:17	Medium	2