outline-manager-appimage

maintainer Felixoid · 5 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from an AWS S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases) controlled by Jigsaw-Code (Google), which is the legitimate upstream vendor for Outline Manager. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the source is a prebuilt binary AppImage rather than source code, and it is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract. The S3 bucket is the official release channel referenced in the upstream GitHub repo (Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases), making this more of a 'binary blob from vendor' pattern than a truly unofficial host. The risk is real but typical for AppImage packaging: if the S3 bucket or the sha256 were compromised, arbitrary code would execute. The sha256 pin mitigates substitution attacks. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt binary packaging, not a clear attack.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:17 source=("${_app_image}::https://s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases/manager/linux/${pkgver}/${_build_version}/Outline-Manager.AppImage")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from an AWS S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases) controlled by Jigsaw-Code (Google), which is the legitimate upstream vendor for Outline Manager. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the source is a prebuilt binary AppImage rather than source code, and it is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract. The S3 bucket is the official release channel referenced in the upstream GitHub repo (Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases), making this more of a 'binary blob from vendor' pattern than a truly unofficial host. The risk is real but typical for AppImage packaging: if the S3 bucket or the sha256 were compromised, arbitrary code would execute. The sha256 pin mitigates substitution attacks. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt binary packaging, not a clear attack.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: DuckSoft <realducksoft at gmail dot com>
2_name=outline-manager
3pkgname=${_name}-appimage
4pkgver=1.19.0
5pkgrel=1
6pkgdesc="Creates and manages Outline servers, powered by Shadowsocks."
7arch=('x86_64')
8url="https://github.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-server"
9license=('Apache')
10makedepends=('git')
11options=(!strip)
12provides=(${_name})
13conficts=(${_name})
14# See https://github.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases/blob/master/manager/latest-linux.yml
15_app_image="Outline-Manager-v${pkgver}.AppImage"
16_build_version=1
17source=("${_app_image}::https://s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases/manager/linux/${pkgver}/${_build_version}/Outline-Manager.AppImage")
18sha256sums=(46f6e2c5be6e05f286405c9436c1592b2bed9337a4ad8fe59756cc2ac6a19eda)
19
20#######################################
21# To get all available download links #
22#######################################
23# usage: bash -c '. PKGBUILD; get_version_links'
24get_version_links() {
25 docker run -i --entrypoint=python public.ecr.aws/lambda/python:3.12 <<EOF
26from pprint import pprint
27from boto3 import client
28from botocore import UNSIGNED
29from botocore.client import Config
30s3c = client('s3',config=Config(signature_version=UNSIGNED))
31pprint([o['Key'] for o in s3c.list_objects_v2(Bucket='outline-releases', Prefix='manager/linux')['Contents'] if o['Key'].endswith('.AppImage')])
32EOF
33}
34#######################################
35
36prepare() {
37 chmod +x ${_app_image}
38 ./${_app_image} --appimage-extract usr/share/icons/hicolor > /dev/null
39 ./${_app_image} --appimage-extract '@outlineserver_manager.desktop' > /dev/null
40 mv 'squashfs-root/@outlineserver_manager.desktop' "squashfs-root/${_name}.desktop"
41
42 sed -i -E "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=env DESKTOPINTEGRATION=false /usr/bin/${_name}|"\
43 "squashfs-root/${_name}.desktop"
44}
45
46
47package() {
48 cd squashfs-root
49 find "usr/share/icons/hicolor" -type f -exec install -Dm644 "{}" "${pkgdir}/{}" \;
50 install -Dm644 "${_name}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_name}.desktop"
51 cd ${srcdir}
52
53 install -Dm755 -t "$pkgdir/opt/${_name}/" "$srcdir/${_app_image}"
54 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
55 ln -sf "/opt/${_name}/${_app_image}" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/${_name}"
56}
57

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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