outline-manager-appimage
The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from an AWS S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases) controlled by Jigsaw-Code (Google), which is the legitimate upstream vendor for Outline Manager. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the source is a prebuilt binary AppImage rather than source code, and it is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract. The S3 bucket is the official release channel referenced in the upstream GitHub repo (Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases), making this more of a 'binary blob from vendor' pattern than a truly unofficial host. The risk is real but typical for AppImage packaging: if the S3 bucket or the sha256 were compromised, arbitrary code would execute. The sha256 pin mitigates substitution attacks. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt binary packaging, not a clear attack.
Triggered rules
source_untrusted_domain
One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).
-
PKGBUILD:17
source=("${_app_image}::https://s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases/manager/linux/${pkgver}/${_build_version}/Outline-Manager.AppImage")
llm_review
An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt AppImage binary from an AWS S3 bucket (s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases) controlled by Jigsaw-Code (Google), which is the legitimate upstream vendor for Outline Manager. The sha256sum is pinned, providing integrity verification. However, the source is a prebuilt binary AppImage rather than source code, and it is executed during prepare() via --appimage-extract. The S3 bucket is the official release channel referenced in the upstream GitHub repo (Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases), making this more of a 'binary blob from vendor' pattern than a truly unofficial host. The risk is real but typical for AppImage packaging: if the S3 bucket or the sha256 were compromised, arbitrary code would execute. The sha256 pin mitigates substitution attacks. This is a standard medium-risk pattern for prebuilt binary packaging, not a clear attack.
PKGBUILD
1 offending line(s) highlighted# Maintainer: DuckSoft <realducksoft at gmail dot com>
_name=outline-manager
pkgname=${_name}-appimage
pkgver=1.19.0
pkgrel=1
pkgdesc="Creates and manages Outline servers, powered by Shadowsocks."
arch=('x86_64')
url="https://github.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-server"
license=('Apache')
makedepends=('git')
options=(!strip)
provides=(${_name})
conficts=(${_name})
# See https://github.com/Jigsaw-Code/outline-releases/blob/master/manager/latest-linux.yml
_app_image="Outline-Manager-v${pkgver}.AppImage"
_build_version=1
source=("${_app_image}::https://s3.amazonaws.com/outline-releases/manager/linux/${pkgver}/${_build_version}/Outline-Manager.AppImage")
sha256sums=(46f6e2c5be6e05f286405c9436c1592b2bed9337a4ad8fe59756cc2ac6a19eda)
#######################################
# To get all available download links #
#######################################
# usage: bash -c '. PKGBUILD; get_version_links'
get_version_links() {
docker run -i --entrypoint=python public.ecr.aws/lambda/python:3.12 <<EOF
from pprint import pprint
from boto3 import client
from botocore import UNSIGNED
from botocore.client import Config
s3c = client('s3',config=Config(signature_version=UNSIGNED))
pprint([o['Key'] for o in s3c.list_objects_v2(Bucket='outline-releases', Prefix='manager/linux')['Contents'] if o['Key'].endswith('.AppImage')])
EOF
}
#######################################
prepare() {
chmod +x ${_app_image}
./${_app_image} --appimage-extract usr/share/icons/hicolor > /dev/null
./${_app_image} --appimage-extract '@outlineserver_manager.desktop' > /dev/null
mv 'squashfs-root/@outlineserver_manager.desktop' "squashfs-root/${_name}.desktop"
sed -i -E "s|Exec=AppRun|Exec=env DESKTOPINTEGRATION=false /usr/bin/${_name}|"\
"squashfs-root/${_name}.desktop"
}
package() {
cd squashfs-root
find "usr/share/icons/hicolor" -type f -exec install -Dm644 "{}" "${pkgdir}/{}" \;
install -Dm644 "${_name}.desktop" "${pkgdir}/usr/share/applications/${_name}.desktop"
cd ${srcdir}
install -Dm755 -t "$pkgdir/opt/${_name}/" "$srcdir/${_app_image}"
mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
ln -sf "/opt/${_name}/${_app_image}" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/${_name}"
}
Scan history
| Scanned at (UTC) | Severity | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| 2026-09-17 00:27:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-16 00:03:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-15 00:25:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-14 00:27:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-13 00:19:54 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-12 00:25:17 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-11 00:19:22 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-10 00:22:44 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-09 00:04:09 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-08 00:18:08 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-07 00:30:15 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-06 00:17:06 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-05 00:16:27 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-04 00:03:13 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-03 00:15:47 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-02 00:02:31 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-09-01 00:11:19 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-31 00:19:57 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-30 00:04:14 | Medium | 2 |
| 2026-08-29 00:29:17 | Medium | 2 |