overte-server-bin

maintainer robertfoster · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt RPM binaries (executed code) from a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket (overte-public.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com) rather than building from source. The host appears to be the official Overte project's own storage (the bucket name 'overte-public' and the URL path structure match the project), and sha256sums are provided for integrity verification. However, this is still a supply-chain concern: the binaries are not built locally, the DigitalOcean Spaces bucket is not a traditional official distribution channel, and if the bucket were compromised or the object replaced before the hash was recorded, malicious code could be executed. The sha256sums do provide a meaningful integrity check against substitution after the PKGBUILD is published, but the trust anchor is the bucket owner rather than a signed release. This is a classic AUR prebuilt-binary pattern that warrants medium severity — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain risk from executed binaries sourced from a cloud storage bucket.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:27 source_x86_64=("https://overte-public.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/build/overte/release/${_date}/overte-server-${pkgver}-1.fc41.x86_64.rpm")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): This PKGBUILD downloads prebuilt RPM binaries (executed code) from a DigitalOcean Spaces bucket (overte-public.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com) rather than building from source. The host appears to be the official Overte project's own storage (the bucket name 'overte-public' and the URL path structure match the project), and sha256sums are provided for integrity verification. However, this is still a supply-chain concern: the binaries are not built locally, the DigitalOcean Spaces bucket is not a traditional official distribution channel, and if the bucket were compromised or the object replaced before the hash was recorded, malicious code could be executed. The sha256sums do provide a meaningful integrity check against substitution after the PKGBUILD is published, but the trust anchor is the bucket owner rather than a signed release. This is a classic AUR prebuilt-binary pattern that warrants medium severity — not clearly malicious, but a real supply-chain risk from executed binaries sourced from a cloud storage bucket.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: robertfoster
2
3pkgname=overte-server-bin
4_date=2025.05.1
5pkgver="${_date}.53d2094"
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="Overte platform, based on the High Fidelity Engine (server)"
8arch=('aarch64' 'x86_64')
9url="https://overte.org"
10license=('Apache-2.0')
11depends=(
12 'libglvnd'
13 'libstdc++5'
14 'mesa'
15 'openssl'
16 'qt5-base'
17 'qt5-declarative'
18 'qt5-websockets'
19)
20makedepends=('rpmextract')
21provides=('overte' 'overte-server')
22conflicts=('overte' 'overte-server')
23source=(
24 'overte.sysusers'
25 'overte.tmpfiles'
26)
27source_x86_64=("https://overte-public.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/build/overte/release/${_date}/overte-server-${pkgver}-1.fc41.x86_64.rpm")
28source_aarch64=("https://overte-public.fra1.digitaloceanspaces.com/build/overte/release/${_date}/overte-server-${pkgver}-1.fc41.aarch64.rpm")
29
30package() {
31 cd "${srcdir}"
32 cp -rv opt usr "${pkgdir}"
33 rm -rf "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/.build-id"
34 mkdir -p "${pkgdir}/etc/opt/overte"
35
36 install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/overte.sysusers" \
37 "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/sysusers.d/overte.conf"
38 install -D -m644 "${srcdir}/overte.tmpfiles" \
39 "${pkgdir}/usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/overte.conf"
40}
41
42sha256sums=('503dfd4562efdbb01f5e714a89d9b23a675e32f9733552532750393be85ca0e3'
43 '83b66df9d94878ca1de31e85a48e905501a7db202bee9950e6c2ab32b85b1461')
44sha256sums_aarch64=('f24cad2dcfae85ebc826493cceb41dd9d59ce1a8db6770e1c1893905f057c0b9')
45sha256sums_x86_64=('84d5637a5531878ad4f99a99a6616f0698ea9b2b8c53f2880fbf9cde594d18a9')
46

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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