paper-desktop-bin

maintainer moniquecrivelli · 0 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.paper.design (the vendor's own download server, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — if the host is compromised or the URL is hijacked, a malicious binary would be installed silently; (2) the URL 'https://download.paper.design/linux/deb' appears to serve a rolling/latest release rather than a pinned version, so the downloaded binary can change at any time without the PKGBUILD reflecting it; (3) a prebuilt closed-source binary is being executed on the user's system. The host itself (download.paper.design) is the official vendor domain matching the project URL (paper.design), which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk. The combination of an executed binary with no checksum verification is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk if the CDN or DNS is compromised.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:11 source=("${pkgname%-bin}.deb::https://download.paper.design/linux/deb")
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): This PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary .deb from download.paper.design (the vendor's own download server, not a personal/unofficial host) and installs it directly. The main concerns are: (1) sha256sums=('SKIP') means no integrity verification — if the host is compromised or the URL is hijacked, a malicious binary would be installed silently; (2) the URL 'https://download.paper.design/linux/deb' appears to serve a rolling/latest release rather than a pinned version, so the downloaded binary can change at any time without the PKGBUILD reflecting it; (3) a prebuilt closed-source binary is being executed on the user's system. The host itself (download.paper.design) is the official vendor domain matching the project URL (paper.design), which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk. The combination of an executed binary with no checksum verification is a genuine medium-severity supply-chain concern — not clearly malicious, but a real risk if the CDN or DNS is compromised.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: Wei Zhu <yesmeck@gmail.com>
2pkgname=paper-desktop-bin
3pkgver=0.1.10
4pkgrel=1
5pkgdesc="Paper is a modern and powerful design tool that helps you create, share, and ship your best work."
6arch=('x86_64')
7url="https://paper.design"
8license=('custom')
9options=('!debug' '!strip')
10depends=('gtk3' 'webkit2gtk' 'libappindicator-gtk3')
11source=("${pkgname%-bin}.deb::https://download.paper.design/linux/deb")
12sha256sums=('SKIP')
13
14pkgver() {
15 cd "$srcdir"
16 # Extract control info from deb to get version
17 bsdtar -xf "${pkgname%-bin}.deb" control.tar.xz
18 bsdtar -xf control.tar.xz ./control
19 grep -E '^Version:' control | sed 's/Version: //' | cut -d'-' -f1
20}
21
22package() {
23 # Extract the deb package
24 bsdtar -xf "$srcdir/${pkgname%-bin}.deb" -C "$srcdir"
25 bsdtar -xf "$srcdir/data.tar.xz" -C "$pkgdir"
26
27 # Fix permissions
28 find "$pkgdir" -type d -exec chmod 755 {} \;
29 find "$pkgdir" -type f -exec chmod 644 {} \;
30
31 # Make binaries executable
32 find "$pkgdir/usr/bin" -type f -exec chmod 755 {} \; 2>/dev/null || true
33
34 # Make the main binary in /opt executable
35 chmod 755 "$pkgdir/opt/Paper/paper-desktop"
36
37 # Create symlink to /usr/bin if it doesn't exist
38 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
39 ln -sf "/opt/Paper/paper-desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/bin/paper-desktop"
40}
41

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

Report a package

Reports go to the AURWatch maintainer (one person) and are read by hand. No login required.

0 / 4000
Your suggestion