parajve

maintainer produnis · 2 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (ParaJVE_0.7.0_linux.tgz) from dlf.emu-land.net, which is a third-party emulation archive site rather than the official project host (vectrex.fr). The tarball contains native shared libraries (libs/setup/*32* and *64* references) that are installed and executed at runtime. The official project URL is vectrex.fr/ParaJVE/ but the source is fetched from a different domain entirely. While emu-land.net is a known emulation archive and not obviously malicious, it is not the canonical upstream release host, creating a genuine supply-chain concern: if that host is compromised or serves a modified binary, users would execute arbitrary native code. The integrity check uses only MD5 (weak, collision-prone) rather than SHA-256 or b2. The combination of a non-official host, prebuilt native binaries/libraries, and weak checksums constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk. The 'any' architecture claim is also suspicious given arch-specific library selection. No piracy or broken flags apply.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:13 source=('https://dlf.emu-land.net/vert/ParaJVE_0.7.0_linux.tgz'
  • PKGBUILD:14 'http://dl.openhandhelds.org/dingoo/screenshots/splash.png'
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The PKGBUILD downloads a prebuilt binary tarball (ParaJVE_0.7.0_linux.tgz) from dlf.emu-land.net, which is a third-party emulation archive site rather than the official project host (vectrex.fr). The tarball contains native shared libraries (libs/setup/*32* and *64* references) that are installed and executed at runtime. The official project URL is vectrex.fr/ParaJVE/ but the source is fetched from a different domain entirely. While emu-land.net is a known emulation archive and not obviously malicious, it is not the canonical upstream release host, creating a genuine supply-chain concern: if that host is compromised or serves a modified binary, users would execute arbitrary native code. The integrity check uses only MD5 (weak, collision-prone) rather than SHA-256 or b2. The combination of a non-official host, prebuilt native binaries/libraries, and weak checksums constitutes a real medium-severity supply-chain risk. The 'any' architecture claim is also suspicious given arch-specific library selection. No piracy or broken flags apply.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: produnis <joe dot slam at produnis dot de>
2# Contributor: archtux <antonio dot arias99999 at gmail dot com>
3
4pkgname=parajve
5pkgver=0.7.0
6pkgrel=2
7pkgdesc="Advanced emulator for the GCE Vectrex game console(1982) with built-in game ROMS."
8arch=('any')
9url="http://www.vectrex.fr/ParaJVE/"
10license=('custom')
11depends=('java-runtime')
12install=$pkgname.install
13source=('https://dlf.emu-land.net/vert/ParaJVE_0.7.0_linux.tgz'
14 'http://dl.openhandhelds.org/dingoo/screenshots/splash.png'
15 LICENSE
16 $pkgname
17 $pkgname.desktop)
18md5sums=('146dcf4bd42865d5fb930dde6a8d34f5'
19 '3b44b85d75849edd67bc021e2e03317e'
20 '7f135fe82df5edc0b1b9952851837b53'
21 'e17a3dd4473b2b65ae257fbd045466bc'
22 'a0536133a127435f8f715d5dd68da074')
23
24package() {
25 cd $srcdir/ParaJVE
26
27 # Delete unneeded files
28 if [ "${CARCH}" = 'x86_64' ]; then
29 rm libs/setup/*32*
30 elif [ "${CARCH}" = 'i686' ]; then
31 rm libs/setup/*64*
32 fi
33
34 # Data
35 mkdir -p $pkgdir/usr/share/$pkgname
36 cp -r * $pkgdir/usr/share/$pkgname
37
38 # Start file
39 cd ..
40 install -Dm755 $pkgname $pkgdir/usr/bin/$pkgname
41
42 # License
43 install -Dm644 LICENSE $pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/ParaJVE/LICENSE
44
45 # Desktop icon
46 install -Dm644 splash.png $pkgdir/usr/share/pixmaps/$pkgname.png
47 install -Dm644 $pkgname.desktop $pkgdir/usr/share/applications/$pkgname.desktop
48
49 # Write permissions
50 chmod 777 -R $pkgdir/usr/share/$pkgname
51}
52

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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