pdi-ce

maintainer erzsebetszabo · 10 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The package downloads a prebuilt binary archive (pdi-ce zip containing JARs and native executables) from an AWS S3 bucket ('privatefilesbucket-community-edition') that is not the canonical Pentaho/Hitachi Vantara official download domain. While Pentaho does use S3 for distribution, this specific bucket name is not the well-known official release host, and S3 buckets can be silently replaced or taken over. The sha1sums provide some integrity protection, but SHA1 is weak and the source is a prebuilt binary blob rather than source code. The wrapper scripts (spoon, carte, kitchen, pan) are local files with checksums, which is fine. The core concern is the prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host — this is a genuine medium supply-chain risk, not a false positive, though there is no evidence of active malice.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM source=() URL on a non-standard host source_untrusted_domain

One or more source=() URLs point to a host outside the trusted allowlist (github.com, gitlab.com, codeberg.org, pypi.org, …).

  • PKGBUILD:15 "https://privatefilesbucket-community-edition.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/${pkgver//_/-}/ce/client-tools/pdi-ce-${pkgver//_/-}.zip"
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 72%): The package downloads a prebuilt binary archive (pdi-ce zip containing JARs and native executables) from an AWS S3 bucket ('privatefilesbucket-community-edition') that is not the canonical Pentaho/Hitachi Vantara official download domain. While Pentaho does use S3 for distribution, this specific bucket name is not the well-known official release host, and S3 buckets can be silently replaced or taken over. The sha1sums provide some integrity protection, but SHA1 is weak and the source is a prebuilt binary blob rather than source code. The wrapper scripts (spoon, carte, kitchen, pan) are local files with checksums, which is fine. The core concern is the prebuilt binary from a non-canonical host — this is a genuine medium supply-chain risk, not a false positive, though there is no evidence of active malice.

PKGBUILD

1 offending line(s) highlighted
1# Maintainer: shinka <shinnkka1@gmail.com>
2
3pkgname=pdi-ce
4pkgver=9.4.0.0_343
5pkgrel=1
6
7pkgdesc='Pentaho Data Integration (ETL) a.k.a Kettle'
8arch=('x86_64')
9url='https://pentaho.com/pentaho-developer-edition/'
10license=('Apache-2.0')
11
12depends=('java-runtime' 'gtk3' 'libxtst')
13
14source=(
15 "https://privatefilesbucket-community-edition.s3.us-west-2.amazonaws.com/${pkgver//_/-}/ce/client-tools/pdi-ce-${pkgver//_/-}.zip"
16 "spoon"
17 "carte"
18 "kitchen"
19 "pan"
20 "spoon.desktop"
21)
22sha1sums=('bd89671a9d6f95948d3fbbfd33102710f3e004e0'
23 'b4166cbcb4fe8c77a4fc4ac02b08703aeacb9759'
24 'cff3ac6b1df50792b41e613d39bcc3a04eea2e18'
25 '0e06b24ffdfad8af2f321ad855d819d5cf4b085c'
26 '1d1a0b6f5ef9a9a48280fb8c98d8feea0d62df4a'
27 '99ff161080cfd675a11928dd467426ba72df4e77')
28
29package() {
30 install -d "$pkgdir/opt/pdi"
31 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
32 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications"
33 install -d "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons"
34
35 cp -r data-integration/* "$pkgdir/opt/pdi"
36 install -m 755 spoon carte kitchen pan "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
37 install -m 644 "spoon.desktop" "$pkgdir/usr/share/applications/spoon.desktop"
38 install -m 644 data-integration/spoon.png "$pkgdir/usr/share/icons/spoon.png"
39}
40

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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