pegdbserver_power

maintainer pattop · 1 votes · scanned 2026-08-03 00:08:14.047287
MEDIUM
View on AUR ↗
Why flagged The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt JAR (containing native Linux binaries under lin/) from pemicro.com at build time inside prepare(), outside the source=() array, meaning no checksum verification is performed. The downloaded JAR is then unpacked and its contents (pegdbserver_power_console and GDI libraries) are installed as executable binaries. While pemicro.com is the legitimate vendor site, the lack of integrity verification means any MITM or server-side substitution would silently deliver arbitrary code that gets installed and executed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed native binaries from an external host with no checksum. The pattern of dynamic version discovery followed by an unverified binary download is a real medium-severity risk, not a false positive.

Triggered rules

MEDIUM External download from an untrusted host, not in source=() external_download_not_in_source

curl/wget fetches a URL on a non-allowlisted host that is not part of source=(), so it is not checksum-verified by makepkg.

  • PKGBUILD:20 wget -q -O- http://www.pemicro.com/eclipse/updates/com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc.updatesite/artifacts.jar | \
  • PKGBUILD:22 wget -O source.jar http://www.pemicro.com/eclipse/updates/com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc.updatesite/plugins/com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc_$(cat version).jar
MEDIUM AI review llm_review

An AI model (anthropic/claude-4.6-sonnet-20260217) reviewed this and agrees it is MEDIUM (confidence 82%): The PKGBUILD fetches a prebuilt JAR (containing native Linux binaries under lin/) from pemicro.com at build time inside prepare(), outside the source=() array, meaning no checksum verification is performed. The downloaded JAR is then unpacked and its contents (pegdbserver_power_console and GDI libraries) are installed as executable binaries. While pemicro.com is the legitimate vendor site, the lack of integrity verification means any MITM or server-side substitution would silently deliver arbitrary code that gets installed and executed. This is a genuine supply-chain concern: executed native binaries from an external host with no checksum. The pattern of dynamic version discovery followed by an unverified binary download is a real medium-severity risk, not a false positive.

PKGBUILD

2 offending line(s) highlighted
1#
2# Maintainer: Patrick Oppenlander <patrick.oppenlander at gmail.com>
3#
4pkgname=pegdbserver_power
5pkgver=2.0.2.202005132054
6pkgrel=1
7pkgdesc="GDB server for Power devices using P&E JTAG hardware"
8url="http://www.pemicro.com"
9arch=(x86_64)
10license=(custom)
11depends=(libusb-compat)
12makedepends=(wget unzip gzip)
13install=pegdbserver_power.install
14source=(license_gdb.pdf 55-pemicro.rules)
15sha256sums=(6b135ddd5388f6a0dd1d1d9d6c6d7321423f391914312c4a4aafd9d851d10dbc
16 4b9812f801faedb8a39c7e95bd829efeeb2941b1f4fb3ca774cfbf1ef4fa4081)
17options=('!strip')
18
19prepare() {
20 wget -q -O- http://www.pemicro.com/eclipse/updates/com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc.updatesite/artifacts.jar | \
21 zcat | grep "<artifact.*com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc.feature" | cut -d\' -f6 > version
22 wget -O source.jar http://www.pemicro.com/eclipse/updates/com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc.updatesite/plugins/com.pemicro.debug.gdbjtag.ppc_$(cat version).jar
23 unzip -q source.jar
24}
25
26pkgver() {
27 cat version
28}
29
30package() {
31 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname"
32 cp -r lin/* "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname"
33 chmod +x "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/pegdbserver_power_console"
34 chmod 644 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/gdi/P&E"/*
35 chmod 666 "$pkgdir/opt/$pkgname/gdi/P&E"/*.add
36
37 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/etc/udev/rules.d"
38 cp 55-pemicro.rules "$pkgdir/etc/udev/rules.d"
39
40 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/bin"
41 ln -s /opt/$pkgname/pegdbserver_power_console "$pkgdir/usr/bin/pegdbserver_power_console"
42
43 mkdir -p "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname"
44 cp license_gdb.pdf "$pkgdir/usr/share/licenses/$pkgname"
45}
46
47

Scan history

Scanned at (UTC)SeverityRules
2026-08-03 00:08:14 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-02 00:16:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-08-01 00:11:18 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-31 00:14:10 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-30 00:17:23 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-29 00:25:53 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-28 00:07:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-27 00:24:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-26 00:07:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-25 00:13:44 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-24 00:02:28 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-23 00:14:47 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-22 00:29:32 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-21 00:24:15 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-20 00:19:49 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-19 00:17:08 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-18 00:14:48 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-17 00:06:16 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-16 00:05:41 MEDIUM 2
2026-07-15 00:09:25 MEDIUM 2

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